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Preface
This thesis consists of three essays that I wrote during my Ph.D. studies.
Chapters 1 and 3 are based on two solo-authored working papers. Chapter
2 is based on a working paper co-authored with Dr. Christoph Winter. The
three essays are closely related under common themes. However, they are
organized in a largely self-contained way, so that one can read each chapter
individually. Technical details are provided in the appendixes, including
analytical derivations and computational algorithms.
The lastest version of the paper in Chapter 1 is entitled “Underdevel-
opment of Financial Markets and Excess Consumption Growth Volatility in
Developing Countries ” and can be downloaded from
https : //sites.google.com/site/hengchenjmk/jobmarketpaper
hengchen.pdf?attredirects = 0
The research paper version of Chapter 2 is entitled “Mortgage Loans, the
Decline of the Household Saving Rate and the Increase in Risk-Sharing ” and
can be downloaded from
https : //sites.google.com/site/hengchenjmk/housing master tex.pdf
?attredirects = 0
The research paper version of Chapter 2 is entitlted “Why is the Corre-
lation Between Savings and Investment So Low in Developing Countries? ”
and can be downloaded from
https : //sites.google.com/site/hengchenjmk/chapter3.pdf?attredirects =
0&d = 1
PREFACE
“Underdevelopment of Financial Markets and Excess Consump-
tion Growth Volatility in Developing Countries ”
Published: This thesis has not been published yet.
Status: It will be sent to peer-review academic journal.
Presented at/to: Meeting of the European Economic Association (24th
EEA-ESEM), August 2009, Barcelona, Spain; Nordic Summer Symposium in
Macroeconomics (3rd), August 2009, Smogen, Sweden; European Workshop
in Macroeconomics (5th), June 2009, Mannheim, Germany; Conference in
Macroeconomic Analysis and International Finance (13th), May 2009, Crete,
Greece
“Mortgage Loans, the Decline of the Household Saving Rate
and the Increase in Risk-Sharing ”
Published: This thesis has not been published yet.
Status: It will be sent to peer-review academic journal.
Presented at/to: Conference on risk sharing, Zurich, June 2, 2010
“Why is the Correlation Between Savings and Investment So
Low in Developing Countries? ”
Published: This thesis has not been published yet.
Status: It will be sent to peer-review academic journal.
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Introduction
This thesis consists of three macroeconomic essays, dealing with various is-
sues concerning the dynamics of savings and consumption. Chapter 1 focuses
on the excess consumption growth volatility in developing countries. Chapter
2 (joint with Christoph Winter) deals with the changes in saving rate, hous-
ing consumption and risk-sharing in the U.S. economy for the period 1980
- 2000. Chapter 3 studies the savings-investment correlation in low-income
countries.
Chapters 1 and 3 are closely related to each other: They explain dif-
ferences in macroeconomic performance between developing and developed
countries. These chapters contribute to a growing literature, which aims at
identifying structural differences between the two types of economies. Both
of the chapters argue that the natures and effects of productivity shocks
are important determinants of the distinct economic dynamics observed in
developing countries.
Chapter 2 explains the aggregate trends in the U.S. economy during the
era of “financial liberalization”. It shows quantitatively that the institutional
changes in housing mortgage markets can account for a significant share of
the decline of the saving rate, as well the increase in home-ownership rate
and mortgage debt.
Methodologically, all three essays are motived by stylized facts, which
are properly documented either in this thesis or by previous empirical litera-
ture. I explain those statistical regularities with quantitative macroeconomic
models that allow realistic features. This approach has become a mainstream
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tool for macroeconomics in the last 30 years. The advantage is that it allows
one to assess quantitative implications of macroeconomic theories. Macro-
economists have been using model calibration to test a variety of theories and
to evaluate alternative policies. Following this tradition, this thesis provides
three calibrated quantitative models to evaluate to what degree the proposed
theories can match those stylized facts in the data.
The three essays rely on micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium (DSGE) framework. This framework is particularly attractive for
two important reasons. Firstly, micro foundations provide modern macroe-
conomic models with coherent structures and explicit guidelines for empirical
investigation. Secondly, the framework also helps to identify policy implica-
tions of macroeconomic models, that are immune to the so-called “Lucas
critique”.
This thesis makes use of two variants of DSGE models: representative-
agent and heterogeneous-agent models. Representative agent models have
been popular in macroeconomics, as they provide relatively simple shortcuts
to study behaviors of aggregate variables. Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 rely
on the representative agent framework and focus on how consumption and
savings evolve over time.
Chapter 2 offers a model, which is built within the heterogeneous-agent
framework. Models with heterogeneous agents are usually developed to ad-
dress certain features of the data, which cannot be explained within the rep-
resentative agent framework, for instance, consumption inequality, wealth
distribution, etc. Heterogeneity is important and necessary in this essay,
since one of its focuses is risk-sharing opportunities among households, which
cannot be properly addressed in a model with only a representative agent. It,
therefore, explicitly deals with the stationary distribution of the households
over the state space of age, productivity, debt, financial assets and housing
wealth.
The models in the three essays in general do not admit closed-form so-
lutions, unless under special parameter values. Therefore, I have to rely
2
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heavily on various numerical methods to solve and simulate these models.
Broadly speaking, there are two important lines of numerical methods to
solve quantitative macroeconomic models: the value function approach and
the Euler-Equation approach. Both of them have been applied in this thesis.
Chapter 1 and 3 present algorithms to solve functional equation systems,
which are derived from first order conditions and the envelop theorem, etc.
The major difference is that Chapter 1 solves for highly non-linear policy
functions with the Broyden’s method and Chapter 3 makes use of the lin-
earization techniques to obtain a linear form of laws of motion for the state
and choice variables around the steady state.
In Chapter 2, however, we resort to the value function iteration method
. Since in that context, the Euler equation approach is hard to apply, due
to the discontinuities in policy functions. Fortunately, the method of value
function iteration with grid search proves to be very robust. However, it is a
well-known issue that the computing time increases exponentially, when the
discretization of state space increases linearly. Parallel computing techniques
that we use are shown to be helpful to speed up the computation. This
chapter illustrates how the cutting-edge computing technology can be applied
in solving quantitative models in macroeconomics.
In what follows, I briefly summarize the content and main results of each
chapter.
Chapter 1 (Underdevelopment of Financial Market and Excess Consump-
tion Growth Volatility in Developing Countries) aims at explaining the ex-
cess consumption growth volatility puzzle in developing countries. It is a
well-documented fact that the output growth volatility is substantially and
significantly higher in developing countries (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997).
It is not surprising to observe that the consumption growth volatility is also
higher, considering the output growth volatility as underlying macroeconomic
volatility. More interestingly, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003) find that
the negative relationship between volatility and development is even more
pronounced in the case of consumption growth volatility. In other words,
3
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consumption growth volatility in developing countries is disproportionately
higher than in developed countries, relative to output growth volatility.
The purpose of this essay is to construct a theory that is consistent with
these observations. The focus on the excess consumption growth volatility
is well justified: consumption growth volatility has immediate welfare impli-
cations than the output growth volatility. If, for instance, it were the case
that poor countries can insure themselves through international risk-sharing,
consumption growth can be fairly stable and the welfare costs of output
fluctuation would be less significant. However, that is not the case in reality.
I build a DSGE model by following the seminal work by Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997), which shows how the lack of diversification leads to the high
output growth volatility in developing countries. I embed their endogenous
diversification mechanism into a rather standard stochastic growth model.
There are two important channels, with which the dynamics of consumption
behaviors are enriched. Firstly, similar to the Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997),
there is an amplification channel in this model, where uncertainties in the
financial markets are amplified through the capital accumulation process.
Secondly and more importantly, I show that the exogenous uncertainties can
be amplified by the first channel, so that the effects of TFP shocks on the
future output can be more persistent.
These two mechanisms imply more volatile consumption (relative to out-
put) in developing countries than in developed countries. First, while output
just keeps track of the capital level, consumption responds even more to en-
dogenous shocks from the financial market, since these shocks have persistent
effects on future output and consumption opportunity through the amplifi-
cation channel. Since the developing economy is in a less complete financial
market most of the time, this effect is stronger in the developing economy.
It implies that the ratio concerned should be relatively higher in developing
countries.
Second, exogenous TFP shocks are amplified by endogenous shocks from
the financial market. Therefore, the persistence effect on output of exogenous
4
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TFP shocks is endogenously higher. Consumption also responds to this effect
and becomes more volatile. Once more, this type of interaction plays a larger
role in the developing economy. It is almost absent in the developed economy,
since the financial market is complete most of the time.
Interestingly, this model shows that the consumption behavior in develop-
ing countries can be quite different from those in developed countries, given
we assume that both of them are subject to the same productivity shock
process.
The above conclusion has an interesting implication on identifying the
shock properties in developing countries. I conduct the following experi-
ments to show that the identification can be biased, if we ignore the un-
derlying structure in developing countries, i.e. the endogenous incomplete
financial market. Suppose that the model proposed in the essay captures the
reality exactly, but that one tries to understand the data produced by the
model, with a “misspecified” model, where an exogenous difference between
the TFP shock processes for the two types of economy is assumed. The es-
timation of the artificial data concludes that there is a difference between
the TFP processes of the two groups, i.e., the permanent component in the
developing countries case is larger. Obviously, the observed difference should
be attributed to the ignored endogenous diversification channel.
Chapter 2 (Mortgage Loans, the Decline of the Household Saving Rate and
the Increase in Risk-Sharing (with Christoph Winter)) studies to what extent
the changes in housing finance during the mortgage market deregulation can
quantitatively account for the changes in aggregate trends, such as the decline
of personal saving rate, increase in mortgage debt and homeownership rate.
Between 1980 and the beginning of the current century, the U.S. economy
experienced a sharp decline in the personal saving rate. It is a well-known fact
and one of the most important changes in the U.S. economy. Another way
to confirm the shift of resources in the U.S. economy is to observe the other
side of the coin– consumption as share of income, which has been increasing
over the same period. Moreover, mortgage debt has undergone a dramatic
5
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increase over the interested period as well – the mortgage debt to labor
income ratio has increased roughly 15 times. Meanwhile, the homeownership
rate in the U.S. economy has been rising, precisely from 64 % to 69 % .
We present a quantitative life cycle model with housing and mortgage
loans, which allows us to model the impact of financial deregulation. The
life-cycle model consists of households, who are ex-ante identical and become
heterogeneous over their life cycle, due to stochastic income shocks they are
subject to. We incorporate housing into this model, where houses serve both
as consumption goods and assets. More importantly, we model both the
traditional mortgage loan structure and refinancing opportunities to repre-
sent a stylized contrast of the U.S. economy before and after the financial
liberalization.
We argue that refinancing is the key element of the financial liberaliza-
tion. Households can borrow against home equity, when adverse income
shocks occur. When they can refinance, households decrease precautionary
saving and increase both housing and nonhousing consumption. Moreover,
when refinancing is allowed, housing wealth becomes more liquid. Therefore,
households are more willing to accumulate housing stock and raise more
collateralized debt as a consequence. We also find that the decrease in down-
payment requirements allows homeowners to make use of even larger share
of the home equity and therefore amplifies the effects of refinancing.
Consistent with the data, our model delivers a substantial increase in
both net mortgage debt and homeownership rate, as well as substantial part
of the increase in total consumption share.
Chapter 3 (Why is the Correlation Between Savings and Investment So
Low in Developing Countries? ) studies an interesting stylized fact, which
is related to the famous Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Feldstein and Horioka
(1980) argue that the correlation between savings and investment should be
quite low in a world with well integrated financial markets. However, they
show that even for the developed OECD countries, domestic savings and
investment co-move quite closely.
6
INTRODUCTION
I focus on a related issue, which has not attracted as much attention as
the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. As shown in various studies, both cross-section
wise and time series wise, not only the savings-investment correlations are
high, but also they are even higher for industrial countries than for the de-
veloping countries. Existing theories with “frictional market approach” seem
to be at odds with this empirical pattern: If developing countries are less
integrated into international markets, it would imply a higher correlation
between savings and investment.
This chapter shows that the savings-investment correlation is affected by
the relative importance of the permanent (or transitory) component in the
productivity shock process. Permanent income theory suggests that both
savings and investment move in the same direction, given a small open econ-
omy hit by a transitory shock. Or, in other words, transitory shocks trigger
a positive co-movements between savings and investment, which results in
a positive correlation between these two variables. In contrast, savings and
investment respond to the permanent shock in different directions, which re-
sults in a negative correlation. If the permanent (transitory) shocks account
for larger component the shock process, the correlation will be relatively
lower (higher).
Empirically, one of the remarkable and fundamental features of lower in-
come economies is that non-stationary shocks (or shocks to trend growth)
are the primary sources of their fluctuations. In contrast, stationary shocks
(or transitory fluctuations around a stable trend) are driving the business
cycles for industrial economies (Aguiar and Gopinath 2007). If a develop-
ing economy is hit by a productivity shock, it is more likely to be a trend
shock, then savings and investment will be less positively correlated. In
contrast, if a developed economy is hit by a productivity shock, it is more
likely to be transitory, then savings and investment will be more positively
correlated. Therefore, the low savings-investment correlation in developing
countries emerges as the consequence of their underlying shock properties,
which are different from developed countries.
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Chapter 1
Underdevelopment of Financial
Markets and Excess
Consumption Growth Volatility
in Developing Countries
Chapter Summary
This paper aims at explaining, both qualitatively and quantitatively, why con-
sumption growth is substantially more volatile in developing countries than in de-
veloped countries. I propose an infinite-horizon stochastic growth model with en-
dogenous financial development, a` la Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). In this model,
micro-level project indivisibility and aggregate savings determine the degree of di-
versification in financial markets. In addition, countries are subject to TFP shocks
with different means, capturing differences in technology, but with equal variance
and persistence. On average, less technologically advanced economies have lower
income and savings, translating into lower financial development. When the fi-
nancial market is underdeveloped, shocks to investments and TFP endogenously
have more persistent effect on future output. Thus, consumption responds more to
those shocks, and the volatility of consumption relative to the volatility of output
is higher in poorer than in richer countries. I also show that a calibrated version
of the model is consistent with a number of features of the data, without relying
on exogenous differences in the variance and persistence of TFP shocks.
Key words: Financial Market, Diversification, Consumption Growth Volatil-
ity
JEL classification: E2,O1
EXCESS CONSUMPTION GROWTH VOLATILITY
1.1 Introduction
This paper aims at explaining the excess consumption growth volatility puzzle
in developing countries. The data suggest that output growth is generally more
volatile in those countries. More interestingly and puzzlingly, the negative rela-
tionship between volatility and development is even more pronounced in the case
of consumption growth volatility. In other words, consumption growth volatility in
developing countries is disproportionately higher than in developed countries, rel-
ative to output growth volatility (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones 2003). The purpose
of this paper is to construct a theory that is consistent with these observations.
The focus on consumption growth volatility is well justified. The extent to
which high volatility is a first-order problem for developing countries depends on
the extent to which output growth volatility translates into consumption growth
volatility. If, for instance, it were the case that poor countries can insure themselves
through international risk-sharing, consumption growth can be fairly stable and
the welfare costs of output fluctuation would be less significant. However, that
is not the case in reality. Evidence shows (e.g. Lewis 1996) that international
consumption risk sharing is quite limited. This implies that reducing volatility in
developing countries would potentially entail substantial welfare gains.
Figure 1.1: Output and Consumption Growth Volatilities
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Source: WDI data, 1960-2007. Regression of the standard deviation of
consumption per capita growth on the standard deviation of GDP per
capita growth.
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Table 1.1: Excess Consumption Growth Volatility
σc σy σc/σy
Developed countries 2.155 2.403 0.896
(0.46) (0.31) (0.07)
Developing countries 5.385 4.503 1.197
(0.34) (0.19) (0.05)
Difference 3.23 2.101 0.302
(0.57) (0.36) (0.08)
Source: WDI (1960 - 2007). All the numbers
are reported in percentage. σc and σy are
standard deviation for consumption growth
and output growth, respectively. σc/σy is
their ratio. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Using WDI data from 1960 to 2007, I regress the standard deviation of con-
sumption per capita growth on the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth
and country group dummy.1 Figure 1.1 shows the regression lines for developed
and developing countries, respectively. Developed countries cluster around the
lower left corner, which means that both consumption and GDP growth volatili-
ties are low. The picture for developing countries is quite different: Most of them
spread out towards the upper right corner, which means that both volatilities are
higher in developing countries. Moreover, consumption growth seems to present
excess volatility: Consumption growth volatility increases much more in response
to GDP growth volatility. The positive slope of the regression line for developing
countries is significantly higher.
To more clearly identify this pattern, I analyze the ratio of consumption per
capita growth volatility to GDP capita growth volatility. Table 1.1 gives the
average standard deviations of consumption and GDP growth as well as their
ratios in developing and developed countries, respectively. In the second column,
the negative relationship between output growth volatility and income level is
obvious, while the first column shows that the same relationship also holds for
consumption growth. The third column gives the mean ratios in each group and
shows that the average ratio is disproportionately higher in developing countries.
The gap between the two averages, roughly 0.3, is large and statistically significant.
Similar exercises have been conducted using different data in terms of sample
1More than twenty industrial economies are refereed to as developed countries and
the remaining countries of the sample, which have a lower income level, are labeled as
developing countries. Note that very small countries, countries with clearly unreliable
data and oil producers are excluded from the analysis. Consumption and GDP are both
in real per capita terms and in constant local currency unit.
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countries, time interval and frequency.2 Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003) docu-
ment a similar pattern, although the gap that they find is relatively smaller than
mine.3
The existing literature tries to explain why consumption is substantially more
volatile in lower income countries by relying either on different properties of ex-
ogenous shocks (e.g. Aguiar and Gopinath 2007) or on international channels (e.g.
Levchenko 2005, Resende 2006 and Neumeyer and Perri 2005). In contrast, this
paper shows that the frictions in domestic financial markets can help explain the
empirical puzzle.
I propose an otherwise standard stochastic growth model with an infinite hori-
zon. The new element is that the financial market is explicitly modeled, a` la Ace-
moglu and Zilibotti (1997). I assume that agents have access to a large number
of imperfectly correlated risky projects in the intermediate sector which transform
savings into capital goods, only one of which succeeds each periods, i.e. deliv-
ers a positive return. Those projects receive savings from households by issuing
securities in the financial market. When the uncertainty has unraveled, the pro-
ductive project distributes output to security holders. In addition, some of the
risky projects are required to raise a certain amount of savings from individuals,
before being productive. If there are not enough savings in the economy, some
projects are not funded and thus, not all securities are available in the financial
market. In contrast, if there are enough savings in the economy, minimum size
requirements are irrelevant and the financial market is complete.
If the financial market is incomplete, the return to investment in risky securities
is stochastic. It is a good (bad) draw if the productive project is (not) funded and
yields (does not yield) a return. Good draws result in more capital goods being
brought forward to the next period. It implies higher savings, which helps to
better diversify the risks in the intermediate sector. This, in turn, increases the
chances of receiving good draws in the following periods, hence increasing expected
future income.4 In other words, shocks in the financial market amplify themselves
through capital accumulation.
2Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) also lend support to this finding with a relatively small
sample of emerging and industrial economies. Their data suggest that emerging economies
exhibit relatively volatile consumption at business-cycle frequencies, even though the al-
ready high income volatility is controlled for. Resende (2006) studies a sample of 41 small
open economies. His findings are well consistent with previous research. Similarly, De
Ferranti et al. (2000) show that the volatility of the growth rate of real GDP in Latin
American countries is twice as high as in industrial economies, while consumption growth
volatility is three times higher than in industrial economies.
3They construct an income measure based on GNP. The standard deviation of income
growth is higher than that of output growth in both types of economy. They report the
gap between the within-group medians.
4Similarly, bad draws do not only decrease the capital stock, but also reduce the prob-
ability of good draws in the following periods, and further reduce the future expected
income.
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Unlike Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), this model allows exogenous TFP shocks
and their interaction with endogenous shocks from the financial market. I assume
countries to be subject to TFP shocks, which have exactly the same variance
and persistence. The only exogenous difference between developing and developed
economies is the long-run mean TFP, which captures the difference in technological
or productivity levels.
Importantly, the difference in development levels translates into the difference
in diversification of the financial market. In this model, the developed economy
behaves similarly to a standard stochastic growth model. Its steady-state level
of capital is sufficiently high to afford a fully diversified financial market and all
idiosyncratic risks are diversified. Most of the time, it is fluctuating around the
(deterministic) steady state, with the complete financial market. The interesting
difference as compared to standard stochastic growth models is that a sequence
of bad TFP shocks could shift the fully diversified economy away from the steady
state and back to the situation where the financial market is less complete and
the economy could be hit by bad draws. Thus, the model predicts both frequent
“small recessions” and rare deep and persistent recessions in developed countries.
On the other hand, since the developing economy is less productive and the
“steady-state” level of capital is so low, the fully diversified financial market is
not affordable. The economy is always subject to shocks to investment from the
intermediate sector, so that the volatility in both consumption and output will be
higher than in the developed economy. The model also predicts that the output
gains during expansion can be larger in lower income countries. To understand
this, suppose that the economy is hit by a sequence of good TFP shocks. They
lead to higher savings and allow the economy to expand, which improves the
diversification opportunities in the financial market. This, in turn, implies a higher
chance of getting good draws from the financial market. Booms are reinforced and
stronger. This prediction is well consistent with the empirical findings in Caldero´n
and Fuentes. (2006).5
The two important mechanisms (amplification and interaction) imply more
volatile consumption (relative to output) in developing countries than in devel-
oped countries. First, while output just keeps track of the capital level, consump-
tion responds even more to endogenous shocks from the financial market, since
these shocks have persistent effects on future output and consumption opportu-
nity through the amplification channel. Since the developing economy is in a less
complete financial market most of the time, this effect is stronger in the devel-
oping economy. It implies that the ratio concerned should be relatively higher in
developing countries.
Second, exogenous TFP shocks are amplified by endogenous shocks from the
financial market. Therefore, the persistence effect on output of exogenous TFP
5They show that expansions are, on average, stronger in lower income countries (e.g.
Asian developing and Latin-Americans countries) than in industrial ones. In particular,
they show that Colombia and Malaysia achieved the largest output accumulation during
the expansion phases.
14
EXCESS CONSUMPTION GROWTH VOLATILITY
shocks is endogenously higher. Consumption also responds to this effect and be-
comes more volatile. Once more, this type of interaction plays a larger role in
the developing economy. It is almost absent in the developed economy, since the
financial market is complete most of the time.
This paper also sheds some light on the link between frictions in the finan-
cial market and observed differences between measured TFP shock processes (e.g.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) hypothesize that the TFP shock properties are dif-
ferent across groups.)6. I assume there to be no exogenous difference in shock
processes between the two types of economy. Instead, I study how a standard
stochastic growth model, enhanced by the friction of micro-level project indivisi-
bility, could endogenously deliver the observed differences between measured TFP
shock processes.
The quantitative results show that the model can replicate the empirical pat-
tern pretty well. The ratio of consumption growth volatility to output growth
volatility is substantially higher in the developing economy case. The gap gener-
ated by the model accounts for a substantial part of the data. The model also
predicts that an increase in the technological level is associated with a decrease in
both consumption and output growth volatilities. Moreover, consumption growth
volatility should drop even more quickly. The results from simulation data also
confirm this prediction.
The paper relies on the endogenous diversification channel, proposed by Ace-
moglu and Zilibotti (1997). Apart from the fact that the main focus is the con-
sumption volatility puzzle, there are noteworthy differences between this model
and their work. First, I model an economy with an infinite horizon which is better
suited for studying high-frequency phenomena, in contrast to the two-period OLG
framework in their paper, which is appropriate for development issues. Second,
exogenous TFP shocks are included, so that it is possible to quantitatively assess
the model economy with the data. More importantly, the interaction between en-
dogenous and exogenous shocks arises in this model. Third, I impose more general
assumptions on preferences and depreciation, which yield important new insights
and turn out to be critical for solving the puzzle.7 Finally, the general setup of this
model poses technical challenges. The numerical analysis of the paper provides a
functional and successful algorithm for solving the general framework.
This paper finds its place in the growing literature on consumption volatility.
One group of research relies on the international sector to address the question
of why increasing international financial integration is associated with higher con-
sumption volatility in more financially integrated developing countries.
6Measured TFP processes is constructed from Solow residual, where the capital stock
is measured as the sum of past investment, assuming that one unit of saving translates
into one unit of investment in a closed economy.
7They assume logarithm utility and full capital depreciation in their model, which
allows them to derive analytical solutions. However, the simplicity comes at a cost: Sub-
stitution effect, income effect and wealth effect cancel out exactly. The savings rate is
constant and therefore, the relationship between consumption growth volatility and out-
put growth volatility cannot be properly studied.
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For example, Resende (2006) hypothesizes that developing countries are bor-
rowing constrained and therefore, the lack of ability to smooth their consumption
renders the ratio higher than in developed countries. He finds that this mechanism
alone has a rather limited explanatory power.8 Neumeyer and Perri (2005) propose
that shocks to the country risk premium could provide another source of uncer-
tainty and also amplify the exogenous TFP shocks, if the default risk premium
is negatively correlated with TFP shocks. They claim that through this channel,
consumption can be more volatile than output in emerging economies. Levchenko
(2005) adopts the Kocherlakota (1996) framework of risk sharing subject to limited
commitment to explain why consumption volatility can be higher, if lower income
countries are better integrated into the international market.
While this line of research is successful to different degrees, no explanation
is offered as to why the relative consumption growth volatility differential still
exists in less financially integrated developing countries. This empirical fact can
be readily explained by this model.
Another line of research focuses on the different properties of TFP shocks in
emerging countries. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) argue that industrial and lower
income countries undergo different underlying income processes. Their hypothesis
is that there are two components in the productivity shock process, transitory
and permanent. In industrial economies, the transitory shocks are relatively more
important, while in poorer emerging economies, the permanent component plays
a larger role. Their theory implies that consumption is relatively more volatile in
lower income countries.
Although they also point out that the difference in TFP processes might be
a manifestation of deeper frictions in the financial market, they do not focus on
how the financial frictions translate into the observed differences in TFP processes.
This paper attempts to provide a link between these two.
This paper is also related to research focusing on the relationship between
diversification and macroeconomic volatility (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997, Imbs
and Wacziarg 2003, Koren and Tenreyro 2007a and 2007b, and Kalemli-Ozcan
et al. 2009). In contrast to previous research which puts emphasis on output
growth volatility, this paper tries to explain the consumption volatility pattern. It
also stresses the importance of the interaction between aggregate shocks and the
diversification channel, which is absent in the previous literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
basic model and characterizes the equilibrium. A numerical example is used to
explain the basic mechanisms in the model. Section 3 explains the calibration
and simulation strategy and Section 4 presents the basic findings. The empirical
pattern found in the data is compared with the numerical results. The model
is shown to be consistent with a number of features of the data, without relying
on any exogenous differences in the variance and persistence of the TFP shock
process. Section 5 concludes the paper.
8He suggests that the reason why consumption volatility cannot exceed income volatility
is due to the lack of permanent shocks in his model.
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1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Environment
The decentralized model economy is populated by infinitely lived agents. A con-
stant relative risk aversion utility function is assumed to parameterize their pref-
erences. Agents maximize their expected life time utility, which is defined by
U = E0
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
c1−σt
1− σ
where ct is consumption in period t, σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion
and β is the discount factor. The population is constant and normalized to be one.
Labor supply is assumed to be inelastic and, therefore, it is also constant.
The production side consists of two sectors, the final good sector and the
intermediate sector. The final good sector uses capital and labor to produce a
final output. The production function in the final good sector is assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas with capital Kt and labor Lt as inputs
Yt = AtK
η
t L
1−η
t
where η ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output to capital and At is productivity in
period t. Productivity is subject to an aggregate shock.9 Formally, At = e
zitand
zit follows an AR(1) process
zit = (1− ρ)µi + ρzit−1 + εt
where |ρ| < 1 and εt is a serially uncorrected normally distributed random
variable with zero mean and constant variance, that is εt ∼ N (0, σz). µi is a
constant and i is the country type dummy: 0 stands for developing countries and
1 for developed countries. It characterizes the difference between developing and
developed countries: µ0 < µ1.
10
9Note that the growth trend shock is an important source of volatility in output and con-
sumption growth in developing countries, which has been studied by Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007). Since my goal is to explore and highlight the underdevelopment of financial mar-
kets and its effects on consumption growth volatility, I assume away the growth trend of
productivity or, in other words, assume the exogenous productivity growth to be zero.
This can be considered as a de-trended version of a more general model. I provide a
version of this model with a deterministic trend in the Appendix and show that it is not
essential for the results.
10Note that it is the only exogenous difference I assume between these two groups. In a
more general setup, I could assume there to be a stochastic type-switching process: Each
type of economy has some probability of switching to the other type, governed by an
exogenous transition matrix. The switching probability is usually quite low. To keep the
model simple and the results sharp, I assume that the switching probability is zero.
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Agents work in the final goods sector and earn a competitive wage and also
receive capital income through the competitive renting market. Prices, precisely
wage rate and return to capital, are competitively determined by aggregate capital
in the economy, Kt, and the productivity level, At. Agents decide how much to
consume and save every period. They are also allowed to decide on the allocation
of their savings in the financial market.
Following Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), I assume there to be an intermediate
sector, which transforms savings into capital goods brought forward to the next
period without using any labor. There is uncertainty which is represented by a
continuum of equally likely states state ∈ [0, 1]. The transformation technology
takes two forms: Safe and risky projects. The safe project gives the non-stochastic
return r. There is a continuum of risky projects, corresponding to the states of
nature. Risky project j pays a positive return only in state j ∈ [0, 1] and zero
otherwise.
Risky projects are financed by issuing securities in the financial market. Output
from the risky projects is entirely distributed to the holders of securities. No profit
is retained. The payoff to security holders in state of nature j is R ·Fj , if security
holders invest Fj (density) in security indexed by j. It is assumed that R > r,
which is consistent with the intuition that risky assets give a higher return. Note
that not all the projects are necessarily funded, and therefore not all the securities
are available in the economy. The measure of available securities, nt, is determined
in equilibrium.
In addition to deciding on savings (and consumption) in each period, agents
are also allowed to decide how they allocate their savings in the financial market,
i.e. the portfolio decision. They can invest in a set of available risky securities
(i ∈ [0, nt]), which consists of state-contingent claims to the output of the risky
projects, and the safe asset, which consists of claims to the output of a safe tech-
nology. The assets portfolio is defined by α, which is the percentage of savings
invested in the safe asset. It is assumed that α ∈ [0, 1], which means that the
agent is not allowed to borrow to invest in risky or safe assets.
The agents invest an equal amount of savings in risky securities, F , due to the
symmetry of risky assets: The expected return to each risky security is exactly the
same. Moreover, they would invest in all available securities, so that the variance
in the payoff from risky investment is minimized, while the expected return is the
same. That is, Fj = Fi = F , ∀i, j ∈ [0, nt]. This is called “balanced portfolio” . 11
In this model, only one type of friction is introduced, namely micro-level project
indivisibility or minimum requirement of investment: The project, indexed by j ∈
[0, 1], is productive only if it attracts at least a minimum amount of savings from
individuals (see Figure 1.2), M(j). One example is railway production: Building
11It can be shown the expected return rE is constant. rE = F · n · R + (1− n) ·
F · 0 = (1− α) · s · R, which is the same, independent of n. The variance is de-
creasing in n, the measure of risky securities in which agents choose to invest, V ar =
[(1− α) · s ·R]2 [(1− 2R)+ 1R2n].
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a railway requires a large amount of investment before the project becomes useful
and productive. To capture the heterogeneity in minimum size requirement across
projects, it is normalized to zero for projects j < γ, while the minimum size of the
rest is linearly increasing in their index.12 Formally, the minimum size is specified
by
M(j) = max
{
0,
D
1− γ (j − γ)
}
where D is the highest minimum requirement in the economy.
To appreciate the importance of this friction, consider the following case where
D = 0 or γ = 1. Given this assumption, the micro-level project indivisibility is
absent and all projects will be funded. Agents would invest an equal amount in
all risky securities. The return to this portfolio becomes deterministic. Intuitively,
with the assumption that D > 0 and γ < 1, it is not necessarily the case that all
projects could attract enough savings to meet their minimum requirements.
Aggregate savings and associated portfolio choice, together with micro-level
project indivisibility, help determining the measure of open projects in equilibrium.
Intuitively, if savings in the economy are less sufficient, agents would invest in the
safe asset to seek insurance and invest even less in risky securities. Based on the
balanced portfolio, each open project would raise the same amount of savings to
fund its production in the intermediate sector. In equilibrium, given the aggregate
amount of savings allocated to risky projects, the maximum possible measure of
projects will be less than one in the economy.13 Suppose, on the other hand, that
the savings in the economy are sufficiently high and all projects can raise enough
savings to overcome the minimum requirement. The maximum possible measure
of risky securities is one and the market is complete.
1.2.2 Recursive Formulation: Decentralized Equilib-
rium
Formally, the problem solved by the representative agent can be restated in the
following recursive formulation. The measure of available securities, n(K,A), is
a function of aggregate variables. The agent takes this as given, and solves the
following problem:
V (K, k,A) = max
s≥0,1≥α≥0
{
u (c) + β · EK,AV
(
K ′, k′, A′
)}
12The results are not driven by the specification of the linear form. Parameters γ and
D will also be calibrated.
13Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) have an interesting micro foundation for justifying
the mapping from aggregate resources to the maximum measure of securities. A similar
mechanism applies in this model. To avoid a repetition of their analysis, I skip the static
equilibrium determination in the financial market and focus on the dynamic aspect of the
model.
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Figure 1.2: Minimum Requirement of Investment
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Note: The case where minimum investment is assumed.
The value function of the representative agent is a function of aggregate capital,14
K, his own capital k, and aggregate productivity, A. The right-hand side of the
Bellman equation consists of utility derived from current consumption and the
discounted expected continuation value. The expectation is conditional on both
A and K. First, the agent needs information about A to compute the distribution
of A
′
in the next period. Second, the agent also needs to know the probability of
good draws at the end of the period, since there are two possible realizations. The
probability is computed using both aggregate variables, K and A, and n(K,A). In
other words, the expected continuation value must be conditional on K. It reflects
the additional source of uncertainty in the economy, namely the endogenous shocks
from the financial market.
The representative agent chooses saving and portfolio optimally. The repre-
sentative agent’s choice is subject to the budget constraint
14Aggregate capital information is important for the agent to solve the problem. First,
in the decentralized economy, the agent acts as a perfectly competitive price taker, and
factor prices are pinned down by aggregate variables. In a central planner version of this
model, the agent’s portfolio decision is different. The central planner trades off between
opening more projects to diversify risks and a higher expected return. In the end, available
aggregate resources help to determine the measure of active risky projects. Second, the
measure of available securities, n, is necessary information for her to solve for decision
rules. It is jointly determined by aggregate variables A and K.
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c+ s = w(K,A) + ϕ (K,A) · k
where w(K,A) is the wage rate, ϕ (K,A) is the return to capital and k is his
own capital. The representative agent takes factor prices as given and makes the
savings decision, s, and thus the consumption decision, c.
The total amount invested in the safe asset is φ,
φ = α · s
The total amount of investment in risky securities is (1− α) · s. Recall the
“balanced portfolio” : 1) The agent invests in each risky security with F and
2) the measure of securities, in which she invests, is the measure of available
ones,n (K,A). Therefore, the following relationship holds
n · F = (1− α) · s
The following discussion describes the law of motion for the three state vari-
ables. The individual capital accumulation function takes two forms, depending
on the realization of state of nature (see Figure 1.3). Suppose that the state of
nature j is realized at the end of the period. If j < n, project j is both funded and
productive. The agent must have invested in risky securities indexed by j (once
more, recall the balanced portfolio). The agent collects returns from both safe and
risky assets. In this case, the capital in the next period, k′, consists of three com-
ponents: Return from safe asset, r ·α · s, return from risky asset, R · (1−α)n · s, and
undepreciated capital (1− δ) k, where δ is the depreciation rate in the economy.
In this case, I denote k′ as kg. Conversely, if j > n, i.e. project j is not funded,
the agent’s risky portfolio gives no return. Capital at the end of the period only
consists of return from the safe asset and undepreciated capital. Similarly, in this
case I denote k′ as kb.
Since all states of nature have equal chances of being realized, the measure
of available risky securities, n, is also the probability for the agent of receiving a
“good draw” , or k′ = kg. The probability of a “bad draw” is therefore (1− n)
(see Figure 1.3).
The individual capital accumulation function is therefore as follows,
k′ =
{
r · α · s+ (1− δ) · k
r · α · s+R · (1−α)n · s+ (1− δ) · k
if j > n with prob 1− n
if j ≤ n with prob n
The law of motion of aggregate capital is needed for the agents to optimize.15
15The agent could choose an arbitrary belief in the law of motion of aggregate capital. In
equilibrium, it must satisfy the “consistency condition” . See the equilibrium definitions.
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Figure 1.3: Good Draws and Bad Draws
A v a i l a b l e N o t    A v a i l a b l e
G o o d   D r a w B a d   D r a w
n∗
.
Note: The probability of good draws and the availability of risky secu-
rities. The solid line shows the measure of available risky securities and
the probability of good draws. The dashed line shows unavailable risky
securities and the probability of bad draws.
K ′ = Ψ (K,A)
Finally, the exogenous shock process is AR(1) 16,
logA′ = (1− ρ)µi + ρ logA+ ε
Given the model described above, the definition of a competitive equilibrium
is stated as follows:
1. V ∗ (K, k,A) , α∗ (K, k,A) and s∗ (K, k,A) solve the individual’s maximiza-
tion problem, taking n∗ (K,A) as given.
2. Prices, namely wage rate, w∗(K,A) and capital return, ϕ∗ (K,A) , are both
competitively determined.
3. Consistency conditions: The law of motion of aggregate capital is consistent
with the aggregation of individual capital, K ′ = Ψ (K,A) =
∫
k′ di.
16I drop subscript i on Ai, when there is no confusion.
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4. Financial market equilibrium: Given n∗ (K,A), the associated α∗ (K, k,A),
s∗ (K, k,A) and the implied F ∗ (K, k,A) = (1−α
∗)
n∗ · s∗, the following condi-
tions hold:
F ∗ =
D
1− γ (n
∗ − γ) if and only if 0 < n∗ < 1
F ∗ ≥ D if and only if n∗ = 1
5. K = k.
The consistency conditions need to be elaborated. The agent knows the law of
motion for the aggregate shock. She also needs to conjecture the law of motion of
aggregate capital to make her decision. The conjecture, Ψ (K,A), turns out to be
correct and equal to the aggregation of individual capital in equilibrium.
The equilibrium conditions reflect the fact that aggregate resources and micro-
level project indivisibilities jointly determine the measure of available securities.
Agent i
′
s investment in the available security indexed by j, F (i, j), depends on his
savings, portfolio choice and the availability of risky securities. That is, F (i, j) =
(1−α)
n ·s. Therefore,
∫ n
0 F (i, j) dj gives the total amount of risky investment by agent
i. The aggregate risky investment in the whole economy is
∫ 1
0
(∫ n
0 F (i, j) dj
)
di.
The equilibrium is a mapping from aggregate resources to the possible maximum
measure of available securities, and the following condition holds in equilibrium:
∫ 1
0
(∫ n*
0
F ∗(i, j)dj
)
di ≥
∫ n*
0
D
1− γ (n
∗ − γ) dj
where the backward inequality holds, if n∗ = 1, and the equality holds, if n∗ < 1.
The equilibrium conditions are derived using a balanced portfolio rule.
Finally, the economy always remains on the equilibrium path. Therefore, only
the case where K = k is of interest.17
1.2.3 Optimization
Taking n (K,A) as given, the agent solves the optimization problem, which reduces
to two Euler equations (see the Appendix for a detailed solution),
U ′ (c) = β · E
[
U ′ (cg) ·R ·
(
η ·A′ ·Kg(η−1) + (1− δ) · 1
r
)]
(1.1)
17k and K need to be distinguished when posing the decision problems of the household
and firms. The equilibrium that K = k is imposed after firms and the agent has optimized.
I only need to solve for decision rules on the equilibrium path and ignore information
outside the equilibrium path
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U ′ (c) ≥ β · E
[
U ′ (cb) · (1− n)(1
r − nR
) · (η ·A′ ·Kb(η−1) + (1− δ) · 1
r
)]
(1.2)
where cg
(
Kg, kg, A
′
)
and cb
(
Kb, kb, A
′
)
are consumption choices, given the
capital stock kg, kb and the aggregate capital level Kg, Kb in the next period,
while n is the probability of good draws,18 given the state (K,A). The equality
holds in equation (1.2), if and only if n < 1 and the inequality is strict, if and only
if n = 1. The two equations are the Euler equations relating current and future
marginal utilities.
In this model, the diversification opportunity is endogenous. There are two
important cases. First, given a certain state, (K̂, Â), n(K̂, Â) can be equal to one
and the backward inequality holds in the second equation. Only the first Euler
equation is relevant.19 In this case, all risks from the intermediate sector can be
diversified.20 The model behaves similarly to a standard stochastic growth model:
Only exogenous shocks provide uncertainty. Second, in the other states, n(K̂, Â)
can be less than one and equality holds in the second equation. Both equations are
relevant. In this case, the economy is subject to shocks arising from the financial
market.
After imposing the equilibrium conditions, the solution is a combination of
s∗ (k,A) and α∗ (k,A), which satisfies the two functional equations and n∗ (k,A),
which guarantees the financial market equilibrium condition.
1.2.4 Analytical Special Case
In general, the model has no closed-form solution. Interestingly, there is one
special case, which can be solved by paper and pencil and it is the case where the
analytical solution is also obtained in standard stochastic growth models. I study
the special case where δ = 1 and U (c) = log (c). I use the method of “guess and
verify” to solve this case (see the Appendix for the detailed solution). Decision
rules are solved for:
α∗ (k,A) =
R · (1− n∗ (k,A))
R− r · n∗ (k,A)
18The agent uses the given function n (K,A) to compute the probability n at a certain
state. Note that the agent can compute the decision rules, even though she takes an
“incorrect ” belief of n (K,A). The financial market equilibrium condition is violated in
that case. In other words, in equilibrium, the agent will hold a correct belief of n (K,A).
19Given this state, the probability of a bad draw is 0. Moreover, α
(
K̂, Â
)
= 0 and only
the savings decision, s, is of importance for the agent.
20If I further assume R = 1 and r = 1, the model exactly simplifies to the Euler equation
in the standard stochastic growth model.
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s∗ (k,A) = β · η ·A · kα
Using the equilibrium condition, the measure of available risky securities is
also solved for:
n∗ (k,A) =
(R+ γ · r)−
√
(R+ γ · r)2 − 4 · r
(
(R−r)·(1−γ)
D · s∗ + γ ·R
)
2 · r
A few comments are in order. In this special case, the saving rate is constant,
which means that exogenous shocks and capital levels do not affect the agent’s
saving rate. The result is the same as in the standard stochastic growth model with
these two special assumptions. The portfolio choice and the equilibrium measure
of risky securities are the same as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), which means
that their two-period OLG model is a special case of this general framework.
The implications of this solution are that 1) the consumption rate is constant
over time and it is the same in both developing and developed countries; 2) the
ratio of consumption growth volatility to output growth volatility will be one,
in both types of economy. The full depreciation assumption severs one crucial
channel of persistence. Moreover, the substitution and income effects of inter-
temporal prices cancel out under log preference. In this case, the relationship
between consumption and output volatility will be trivial, due to the unrealistic
assumptions. This is one of the reasons why I must analyze the general model.
On the other hand, this analytical solution provides a good starting point for the
numerical computation of the general model, where the rooting finding method
must be used and requires an exact initial guess (see the Appendix for a detailed
solution).
1.2.5 Analysis
Decision Rules and Equilibrium
Policy functions, specifically the savings decision and the portfolio choice, are both
two-dimensional functions of capital, k and productivity, A. The same applies for
the equilibrium measure of available securities or the probability of good draws,
n (k,A). I present decision rules and equilibrium from a special numerical case,21
where the exogenous shock is absent, namely, ρ = 0 and σz = 0. In this special case,
the difference between the two economies is the long-run productivity levels, Ai,
where A0 stands for the developing economy case and A1 for developed economy.
The solutions are denoted by n∗ (k;Ai), α∗ (k;Ai) and s∗ (k;Ai).
21See the next section for the solution algorithm.
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The decision rules are similar in both economies. I plot the decision rules for
the developing economy case with A0 in Figure 1.4 and the developed economy case
with A1 in 1.5. The left-hand plot gives the savings decision, which is concave and
increases in capital. The decreasing curve in the right-hand plot is the portfolio
decision, α. For a given productivity level, the higher is the capital, the less do
agents invest in the safe asset. Up to a certain point, the investment in the safe
asset is positive. After the threshold, agents invest nothing in the safe asset. The
intuition is that agents with low capital would invest in the safe asset to seek
insurance. If agents are sufficiently rich, they invest all their savings in risky
securities to seek a higher return.
Figure 1.4: Decision Rules with A0
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Note: Decision rules in the developing country case. The left-hand plot
gives the savings decision, while the right-hand plot presents the portfolio
decision.
Figure 1.6 shows the dynamics of capital and equilibrium in the developed
economy case with A1. The upper part of Figure 1.6 gives the probability of
good draws in equilibrium, n∗. It increases in k and approaches 1 from below.
As shown in the decision rules, savings increase in capital and the portfolio shifts
toward risky securities, if k becomes higher. The total amount of savings invested
in risky securities increases in k, and based on the equilibrium condition, there is
an expansion in the equilibrium measure of available securities; hence, the higher
probability of good draws. If capital k is sufficiently high in this economy, full
diversification is achieved, that is n∗ = 1.
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Figure 1.5: Decision Rules with A1
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Note: Decision rules in the developed country case. The left-hand plot
gives the savings decision, while the right-hand plot presents the portfolio
decision.
The lower plot of Figure 1.6 gives two possible realizations of capital, kg and kb.
The plot for kg is increasing in capital, which describes the case of good draws. It
does not only consist of undepreciated capital but also of returns to risky securities
and the safe asset. kb increases in k, when k is very low and decreases until a
threshold where α∗ = 0 and then increases, following the line of (1− δ) · k. As
analyzed before, with the increase in k, the diversification opportunities improve
and investment in the safe asset decreases until zero. Below that threshold, kb
comprises both undepreciated capital and return to the safe asset. Above that
threshold, k is sufficiently high, and kb only consists of undepreciated capital. In
this situation, if bad shocks emerge in the intermediate sector, only undepreciated
capital works as a buffer and becomes capital in the next period.22
The intercept of curve kg with the 45 degree line gives the steady-state of the
economy, k∗1. In this steady state, full diversification is obtained and the probability
of good draws is one. It means that if the economy reaches k∗1, its capital is k∗1 in
22That is a scenario which does not occur in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). In their
model, full depreciation implies that agents invest all their savings in risky assets, only if
the financial market is fully developed. Therefore, another implication of their model is
that a reasonably rich economy could revert back to a really poor economy right before it
becomes fully developed, with a small probability. Introducing undepreciated capital helps
us provide the economy with an additional buffer and avoid the unrealistic implication.
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Figure 1.6: Developed Economy with A1
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Note: Developed country case without exogenous shocks. The upper plot
gives the equilibrium probability of a good draw. The lower plot gives
two possible realizations at the end of the period and a 45 degree line.
The dashed line stands for kb, and the solid line for kg.
the next period with probability one. That is the situation which mimics standard
neoclassical growth models.
Similarly, in the developing economy case with A0, the probability of good
draws in the intermediate sector increases in k and both kg and kb in Figure 1.7
present a similar shape as in Figure 1.6.
The intercept of curve kg with the 45 degree line in Figure 1.7 gives the “pseudo
steady-state” of the developing economy, k∗0. In this case, the pseudo steady-state
level of capital is lower than its counterpart in the developed economy with higher
productivity, A1. More importantly, full diversification is not achieved at this
pseudo steady state. The probability of good draws is lower than one. With a
positive probability, k
′
shifts onto the curve of kb.
A comparison between Figure 1.7 with lower A0 and Figure 1.6 with higher A1
shows that the increase from A0 to A1 shifts the curves of n
∗(k;A) and k′(k;A)
upwards. The following subsection shows that the dynamics of the two economies
differ substantially.
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Figure 1.7: Developing Economy with A0
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Note: Developing country case without exogenous shocks. The upper
plot gives the equilibrium probability of a good draw. The lower plot
gives two possible realizations of capital at the end of the period and a
45 degree line. The dashed line stands for kb, and the solid line for kg.
Consumption Dynamics and Amplification Effect
The developing economy analyzed in the last subsection most of the time exists in
a world with a less fully diversified financial market. Most of the time, it also holds
that k ≤ k∗0,23 because there is always a positive probability that the economy is
hit by bad shocks. Even without exogenous TFP shocks, the capital stock switches
between the curves of kg and kb. Therefore, the output also jumps up and down
substantially as does consumption.
The previous subsection also shows that without any TFP shocks, the devel-
oped economy would achieve full diversification and remain in the steady-state,
where both consumption and output are constant.
It is interesting to compare the developed economy case with standard stochas-
tic growth models. It is not difficult to imagine that with exogenous shocks, the
developed economy fluctuates around the deterministic steady state and behaves
similarly to a standard stochastic growth model. The subtle and non-trivial dif-
ference is that a sequence of bad TFP realizations might possibly decrease capital
to such a low level that full diversification cannot be afforded and the economy
23If the economy starts with a capital k0 < k
∗
0 , its capital will never exceed k
∗
0 .
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could be hit by bad draws. Thus, on one hand, the model predicts frequent “small
recessions” , which are driven by the exogenous TFP shocks around steady-state;
on the other hand, it also predicts that deep and persistent recessions could hap-
pen in developed countries. Those rare events are driven by the combination of a
sequence of low realizations of TFP shocks and the bad draws emerging from the
financial market.
The endogenous diversification channel does not only provide an important
source of uncertainty, which makes output more volatile, it also amplify the uncer-
tainty in a certain period through capital accumulation. Thus, it has interesting
implications for consumption behavior as well. The mechanism of amplification is
that the probability of good draws is an increasing function of k. It means that,
for a given level of capital k, if the economy happens to be hit by a good draw, the
capital will be higher in the next period and the diversification opportunities will
expand. Accordingly, there will be a higher probability of once more being hit by
a good draw in the period after the next. This results in higher output in the next
period and possibly an even higher output in the following periods. In contrast,
if the economy happens to be hit by a bad draw, the capital will be substantially
reduced in the next period and the degree of diversification will also shrink. The
probability of being hit by a good draw decreases further. It results in a lower
output in the next period and possibly even lower outputs in future periods.
This amplification channel is absent in the developed economy most of the time,
since the market is fully diversified and n(k;A1) = 1. In the case of the developing
economy, in contrast, this channel plays an important role in consumption dynam-
ics. As analyzed above, output becomes more volatile in this case, because of the
shocks from incomplete financial market. Consumption will be even more volatile
in the developing economy, in response to both current income of higher volatility
and to the endogenous diversification channel, which affects future consumption
opportunities. In other words, since capital k contains additional information
about future output, consumption would respond to the amplification effect, while
output would just keep track of changes in capital levels.
Moreover, TFP shocks, although assumed to be exogenous, would interact with
endogenous shocks from the financial market. The mechanism of interaction works
as follows. A good realization of the TFP shock enhances the productivity of the
economy. It results in higher savings, which implies more aggregate investment
in risky securities. It helps the economy improve the diversification opportunities,
and therefore increases the probability of good draws. Therefore, even though
the TFP shock itself is transitory, it could be amplified by interacting with the
endogenous diversification channel and have a persistent effect on future output.
In this sense, the TFP shocks would endogenously have a higher persistence.
The model predicts that the output gains during expansion can be larger in
the developing economy: A sequence of good TFP shocks could interact with
the diversification channel and lead to substantial output gains in the developing
economy. In other words, booms are reinforced and become stronger through the
interaction channel. This prediction is well consistent with the empirical findings
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in Caldero´n and Fuentes. (2006), which find that output gains are larger in lower
income countries, during the trough-to-peak phase.
Since the exogenous TFP shocks are endogenously more persistent through
the interaction channel, consumption in the developing economy is expected to
respond to this and becomes more volatile. Once more, this channel plays a minor
role in the developed counterpart since the financial market is complete most of the
time. It implies that the ratio concerned should be relatively higher in developing
countries.
1.3 Numerical Analysis
In this section, I will outline the solution algorithm and the simulation procedure
(see the Appendix for a detailed algorithm). Similarly to most stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium models, the system of equations (equations (1.1) and (1.2))
does not have any analytical solution, except the special case. I solve the model
numerically by exploring the recursive formulation.
The numerical exercise posts interesting challenges. First, the function which
maps aggregate states to the equilibrium measure of available securities needs to
be solved endogenously in equilibrium.24 Second, the endogenous shocks could
substantially shift the capital stock in the economy within a broad ergodic set.
Methods with local approximations cannot be used. Decision rules must be solved
for over a large range in which the curvature of the decision rules changes dramati-
cally. Third, another difficulty is due to the kink-shape of the portfolio decision and
thus, I have to choose the approximation methods wisely. Finally, the inequality
in one of the Euler equations brings in an additional difficulty.
Two steps are taken to solve the general equilibrium problem. First, I take
an educated guess for n (k,A) and solve the two functional equations with a root-
finding (Broyden) method. The solved decision rules, together with the guess,
would imply whether the financial market equilibrium condition holds. Second, if
the equilibrium condition does not hold, update the function of n (k,A) until the
equilibrium condition is met. I simulate the economy for 11000 periods to compute
the average statistics.
1.3.1 Calibration
In this subsection, I outline the calibration strategy. Table 3.3 summarizes the
values and describes the parameters.
24Unlike the Aiyagari-type model, where only one factor price needs to be updated
to ensure the equilibrium, the whole function in this model must be updated until the
equilibrium condition is met.
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I calibrate the model economy with different average productivity parameters,
that is µ0 and µ1, to match certain moments in the data for developing and de-
veloped countries. I normalize the average productivity to be 1 for developing
countries, or µ0 = 0. µ1, which characterizes the average productivity level in
developed countries, will be calibrated. Except for that, all other parameters are
common to both groups of countries.
The remaining parameters are those characterizing preference and technology
and those related to the financial market.
Regarding preference and technology, I parameterize the model using standard
data in the growth literature. I use the standard CRRA utility function, where
the risk aversion parameter is chosen to be 1.5. The discount rate β is standard
from the literature, 0.96. The capital share is set to be 0.3, which is also common
in growth models. I choose the annual depreciation rate to be 0.10. Values of
ρ = 0.95 and σz = 0.02 are widely used in the literature. The AR(1) shock process
is approximated by a Markov chain, using the Tauchen method (Tauchen 1986).
Regarding the parameters characterizing the financial market, the gross return
to safe assets, r, is normalized to 1, and the gross return to risky projects, R, and
the minimum requirement parameters, γ and D, will be calibrated.
I choose to match long run average saving rates (s/y) and output growth
volatilities (σy) in both developing and developed countries by choosing these four
need-to-be-calibrated parameters (see Table 1.3).25 I compute the average saving
rates for developing and developed countries and find there to be a statistically
significant difference between these two groups. It is also interesting to let the
model deliver the correct output growth volatilities and observe if consumption
growth volatilities are sufficiently close to the data.
The parameters are jointly mapped to the targets. An increase in D or a
decrease in γ would shift the curve of minimum requirement upwards and thus,
the economy is more likely to be constrained by micro-level project indivisibility.
The volatility of output growth in both economies will be higher. A higher R
implies that the return to the risky portfolio is higher, which would induce a
higher saving rate in both economies. A larger value of µ1 would only make the
developed economy less constrained and reduce its volatility level. A higher µ1 also
implies that the risky portfolio is “safer” and its savings rate is therefore higher,
since the financial market is more complete, everything else equal.
1.4 Results
This section discusses the basic results from the simulations. I present the represen-
tative simulation series for the experiments of developing and developed countries
25The saving rate refers to the “gross domestic saving rate ” in The World Development
Indicators data. I compute the average saving rate for each country from 1960 to 2007
and compute the group mean for each group.
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Table 1.2: Baseline Parameters
Parameter Economic interpretation Value
σ CRRA risk aversion 1.5
β Annual discount rate 0.96
η Capital share 0.30
δ Depreciation rate 0.10
ρ Shock persistence 0.95
σz Shock standard deviation 0.02
r Return to safe asset 1.00
R Return to risky securities 1.055
D Largest minimum size 1.70
γ Minimum size parameter 0.16
µ Log of average of productivity 0.605
Source: Standard and calibrated parameters
Table 1.3: Moments to Match
Saving Rate Model
Developed countries s/y = 0.25 0.29
Developing countries s/y = 0.19 0.176
Growth Volatility Model
Developed countries σy = 2.403 2.43
Developing countries σy = 4.503 4.48
Source: WDI (1960 - 2007) and simulations
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in Figure 1.8.26 In both experiments, the exogenous shock processes are set to be
exactly the same.
Figure 1.8: Representative Simulation
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Source: Simulation data. Demeaned growth rates of output and con-
sumption are presented on the left-hand side and the right-hand side,
respectively. The thicker curves are from the experiment of the devel-
oped country case while the regular curves are demeaned growth rates
from the experiment of the developing countries. In both experiments,
the persistence and variance of the exogenous shock processes are the
same.
The excess consumption growth volatility pattern is quite clear. The left-hand
side graph presents the demeaned output growth rates of these two experiments.
The thicker line represents the developed economy experiment, while the regular
line stands for the developing economy experiment. It is observed that the devel-
oping economy experiences a more volatile output growth. It is even more obvious
that the volatility of the consumption growth rate is higher in the developing econ-
omy than in the developed economy. As compared to output growth rate volatility,
consumption growth rates seem to be more smooth in the developed case. In the
experiment for the developing economy, the consumption growth rate is much less
smooth.
26A series of realizations of 47 periods is randomly picked from each simulation.
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Table 1.4: Excess Volatility
Type σc σy σc/σy (σc/σy)
data
Developed countries 1.87 2.43 0.768 0.896
Developing countries 4.53 4.48 1.01 1.197
Source: Simulation data and WDI data(1960-2007).
Table 1.5: Development Level
µ0 µa µb µc µ1
µ 0.00 0.25 0.45 0.55 0.605
σc/σy 1.01 0.96 0.93 0.84 0.768
Source: Simulation data.
1.4.1 Basic Results
The main results are summarized in Table 2.5. I compute the average standard
deviation of consumption growth rates from the simulation data. The first col-
umn reports the results from the two experiments. I also compute the ratio of
consumption growth volatility to output growth volatility in the third column.
First, the first and second columns show that the negative relationship be-
tween development and growth volatility exists in the model and it is even more
pronounced in the case of consumption growth volatility.
Second, the third column reveals that, in this model, the ratio of consumption
growth volatility to output growth volatility is substantially higher in the develop-
ing economy. It is approximately 1 in the experiment for the developing economy,
while the ratio in the developed economy case is below 0.77. The pattern found in
the model is well consistent with the empirical findings in the data and in Kose,
Prasad, and Terrones (2003).
This result confirms the intuition that the higher is the development level,
characterized by a higher µ in the model, the less likely would the micro level
constraint be to bind. The financial market will be more complete, shocks from
the intermediate sector would play a minor role, and the ratio in question would be
lower. In this model, it is observed that the lower productivity level is associated
with both higher output and consumption growth volatilities, keeping the variance
and persistence of exogenous shocks unchanged. More interestingly, consumption
growth volatility is disproportionately higher, relative to output growth volatility.
These results are not expected in the standard stochastic growth models.
The model also predicts that if an economy switches from a lower level of devel-
opment to a more advanced level, both consumption and output growth volatility
should be lower and consumption growth volatility should drop more quickly. Ta-
ble 1.5 gives results from a series of experiments, which use intermediate values
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of µ, that is µa, µb and µc, between µ0, the normalized value for the developing
group, and µ1, the calibrated value for the developed group. It is shown that the
ratio of σc/σy decreases steadily with the increase in the value of µ.
Finally, although this model successfully generates the empirical pattern, there
are still notable differences between the model and the data. Volatilities of con-
sumption growth of both types of economy are lower in the model than their coun-
terparts in the data. The model under-predicts the consumption growth volatility
in both types of economy, since there are only two sources of uncertainty in the
model.27
1.4.2 Measuring TFP Properties
With the standard growth accounting method, information about the properties
of TFP shocks can be extracted from the Solow residual, by assuming one unit
of savings in each period to be transformed into one unit of gross investment.
The model assumes there to be an intermediate sector where the transformation
process is stochastic, due to the fact that the financial market is not necessarily
fully diversified. If I make use of information about capital which is actually used
in the final goods production, the Solow residual could correctly help identify the
TFP shock process. Therefore, the properties of the TFP shock should be identical
in simulations for developing and developed economies, since I impose the same
exogenous shock process on both experiments. However, if constructing the capital
sequence by ignoring the incomplete financial market structure, the results will be
biased.
Suppose that the model proposed in the paper exactly captures the reality, but
that one tries to understand the data produced by the model, with a “misspecified”
model, where an exogenous difference between the TFP shock processes for the two
types of economy is assumed. If the estimation concludes there to be a difference
between the TFP processes of the two groups, the observed difference should be
attributed to the ignored endogenous diversification channel.
One of the important findings in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) is that perma-
nent shocks are relatively unimportant in industrial economies, as compared to
lower income emerging economies.28 This section evaluates if this model with an
endogenous diversification channel has the ability to generate the observed differ-
ence. Toward this end, I use the same approach, proposed by Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) to analyze the Solow residual from simulation data.
27However, it is not hard to imagine that other channels of uncertainty would increase
the volatility level of consumption growth. Empirical evidence (e.g. Easterly, Islam, and
Stiglitz 2000) also shows that fiscal policy, public consumption and nominal shocks all help
to increase the volatility in both developing and developed countries. The international
sector can contribute another source of uncertainty, which exposes the economy to external
shocks (e.g. Neumeyer and Perri 2005).
28In their model, they assume the permanent shock to be an accumulative product
of “growth shocks” and growth shocks to be positively correlated. They find that the
Solow residual in lower income countries is more volatile and the permanent component
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I conduct this exercise in the following way. Suppose that one tries to analyze
the simulation data, with an otherwise standard stochastic growth model, aug-
mented by exogenous permanent shocks. The production function is assumed to
be Cobb-Douglas, producing final goods with capital and one unit of labor.
Yt = e
ztKηt (ΓtLt)
1−η
There are two types of shocks. The first is zt, which is a standard AR(1)
process.
zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt
The second, Γt, is used to represent the cumulative product of white noise.
Specifically,
Γt = e
εgt Γt−1 =
t
Π
s=0
eε
g
s
where εg is an innovation from a normal distribution with zero mean and
standard deviation σg.
To directly estimate the underlying shock process, one wants to make use of
information from Solow residuals. Savings in simulation data are assumed to be
converted into investment one for one in a close economy. Given the initial capital
k0 from the simulation, a sequence of pseudo capital can be constructed. With
information on output sequence, the sequence of the pseudo Solow residual can be
backed out from the final goods production function.
To extract information on permanent shocks from the pseudo Solow residual,
one makes use of the standard method proposed by Beveridge and Nelson (1981),
which implies that if following an I(1) process, the log of the Solow residual can
be decomposed into a random walk component and a transitory component.
srt = τt + zt
where srt is the log of the Solow residual. Moreover, τt represents random walk
and follows the below process,
τt = τt−1 + (1− η) εgt
Following the method proposed by Cochrane (1988), the variance of the per-
manent component is estimated with the below approximation,
is larger than it is in developed countries. They further argue that, between the two
groups, the ratio of the standard deviation of permanent shocks to the standard deviation
of mean reverting shocks is different. In the misspecified model, the permanent shock
to be identified is an accumulative product of white noise, which can be interpreted as
uncorrelated growth shocks.
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lim
M→∞
M−1V ar (srt − srt−M ) = σ2∆τ
where srt−M is the M period lag of log of Solow residual. The estimation is
sufficiently accurate, conditional on M being sufficiently large. In practice, it is
difficult to choose M to be sufficiently large due to the limitation of the data length.
However, this exercise is not constrained by data length, since I can simulate the
model for a sufficiently long period of time. I choose M to be unusually large,
higher than what would be chosen in practice. I choose M to be 1000, 2000, 3000,
respectively, in different estimations.
The critical point of this exercise is to discover the difference of permanent
shocks between experiments of developing and developed economies. Towards this
end, I look at the ratio of the standard deviation of permanent shocks in the
developing economy to that in the developed economy. The essential finding is
that the ratio is quite stable and roughly 1.8, despite the choice of M .
σdeveloping∆τ
σdeveloped∆τ
≈ 1.8
This finding shows that if using the standard growth accounting method to
construct the Solow residuals, it would be concluded that there is a difference
in the measured TFP processes. However, the data are generated by the true
model, where no difference in the TFP process is exogenously assumed. In other
words, the diversification channel in this model could at least partially explain the
observed difference in the measured TFP processes of developing and developed
countries.
1.5 Conclusion
Mounting evidence shows that consumption growth exhibits an excess volatility in
developing countries. This pattern has been documented in several recent research
papers.
This research shows that the lack of diversification opportunity in developing
countries could account for the empirical regularity. This paper models this con-
nection based on Acemoglu and Zilibotti(1997)’s classical contribution in this field.
Numerical results show that the model is well in line with the empirical regularity
documented in different datasets, although the volatility of consumption growth
in both groups is obviously lower in the model than in the data. Interestingly, in
this model, even though both types of economy are subject to exactly the same
exogenous shock process, the only difference in average TFP translates into the
excess consumption growth volatility pattern.
In this research, it is argued that the endogenous difference in the financial
development of both types of economy could help explain observed differences
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in TFP processes. When the financial development is low, stochastic shocks to
investments and TFP are endogenously more volatile and more persistent. This
model also has an implication for estimating TFP processes in developing countries:
The estimation might be biased if we ignore the endogenous diversification channel.
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Chapter 2
Mortgage Loans, the Decline of
the Household Saving Rate and
the Increase in Risk-Sharing
Chapter Summary
Between 1980 and the beginning of the current century, the U.S. economy experi-
enced: (i) a sharp decline in the personal saving rate, which was associated with a
consumption boom, (ii) an increase in mortgage debt, (iii) a rise in the homeown-
ership rate and (iv) an improvement in risk-sharing. In this paper, we analyze to
what extent the deregulation of housing finance - i.e., the increased availability of
refinancing opportunities and the decrease of effective downpayment requirements
-accounts for these trends. To study the impact of the financial deregulation,
we implement housing and mortgage loans in an otherwise standard quantitative
life-cycle model. The model is consistent with the increase in both net mortgage
debt and the homeownership rate observed in the data; it delivers one third of
the increase in the ratio of consumption to personal income. Refinancing provides
an additional risk-sharing channel by making housing wealth more liquid. As a
consequence, households reduce their precautionary saving, take out more collat-
eralized loans and increase both housing and nonhousing consumption. We find
that lower downpayment requirements only amplify the effects of refinancing but
they do not cause the observed changes in the aggregate trends.
Key words: Mortgage Loans, Financial Deregulation, Risk-Sharing, House-
hold Consumption and Saving, Incomplete Markets
JEL classification: E2, D5, D9
AND RISK-SHARING
2.1 Introduction
Between 1980 and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the U.S. economy
experienced an 7 percentage point decline in the personal saving rate, and an
increase in the consumption share of personal income by 5.5 percentage points.
Moreover, the homeownership rate rose by 6 percentage points, while household
collateralized debt increased substantially as well.
At the same time, mortgage financing in the U.S. has undergone substantial
changes. As we will document later in this study, until the beginning of the
1980s, fixed-term, level-payment mortgage loans were basically the only way to
finance a home purchase. One of the most important features of these types of
contracts is that homeowners had to increase their share of home equity over the
contract period. During an era of financial deregulation, financial instruments,
which helped homeowners to access to home equity became relatively inexpensive
and widespread.
Our paper tries to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the change in housing
financing on aggregate consumption, saving rate, debt holdings as well as home-
ownership rate. Given that home equity is the single largest position in most
household’s portfolios, and given that the vast majority of homeowners hold mort-
gage debt, it is plausible that the changes in the mortgage market are responsible
for the documented trends.
We find that in total, mortgage market deregulation accounts for roughly one
third of the increase in personal consumption share and the substantial increase in
mortgage debt. Our model is also consistent with the increase in the homeowner-
ship rate that was observed in the U.S. economy. Moreover, we find that refinanc-
ing opportunities play a key role in financial liberalization. The low downpayment
requirements amplify the effects of refinancing but turn out to be relatively less
important.
Our findings are important for the following reasons. Previous literature has
not fully examined the extent to which deregulating mortgage markets accounts
for the aggregate trends in consumption and saving. Parker (1999) argues that
even if financial deregulation is fully responsible for the rise of household debt,
its impact would be too small to account for the increase in aggregate household
expenditures. On the other hand, Feldstein (2008) argues that the high level of of
mortgage refinancing with equity withdrawal is the primary reason for the low U.S.
saving rate and the current account deficit. Recent work by Mendoza et al. (2007)
provides further support for Feldstein’s hypothesis.1 Against the background of
this discussion, our work attempts to evaluate the different hypotheses. Since
there is little doubt that the documented substantial trends are at stake in the
U.S. economy, our results have important implications for optimal policy design.
1Mendoza et al. (2007) show that that differences in saving across countries that result
from differences in financial market development can lead to global imbalances in the
magnitude that is currently observed.
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We construct a life-cycle model to shed further light on the role of mort-
gage market deregulation that accounts for aggregate trends in the U.S. econ-
omy. In our model, households receive utility from consuming housing services
and nondurable goods. Homeownership is endogenous, and housing services can
be acquired through owner-occupied housing or on the rental market. Moreover,
households are subject to idiosyncratic, labor income earnings risk. The finan-
cial market is assumed to be incomplete; households can only self-insure against
earnings shocks by saving in a noncontingent bond.
We model mortgage market deregulation by comparing two different mortgage
regimes that we take as a stylized representation of the mortgage loan contracts
observed in the U.S. economy. In the first regime, homeowners are forced to
repay their obligations, irrespective of the income shocks. Thus, we say that this
type of contract gives rise to “forced saving”in home equity. Moreover, equity
accumulated in the home cannot be accessed for consumption smoothing purposes
later. We also define this regime as a “traditional mortgage”. The modeling of
mortgages resembles the traditional, fixed-term level payment mortgage loan. See
also Chambers et al.(2009a, 2009b) and more recently Nakajima and Telyukova
(2009) for similar approaches to modeling mortgage loans. In the second regime,
homeowners can avoid pre-fixed repayment by periodically refinancing. In other
words, homeowners can revise their mortgage payment contract by negotiating
payment schedules and/or altering the amount of repayment.2
Notice that the key difference between the first and second regime is that in
the latter, households are not forced to accumulate equity in their home beyond
the initial home equity at purchase (the downpayment requirement).
Moreover, an additional consequence of mortgage market deregulation was
the decline in the downpayment requirements. We characterize this aspect of
deregulation by using a lower downpayment ratio in the second regime.
In our experiments, we take an economy where only traditional mortgages
are available as being representative of the pre-deregulation period (beginning of
the 1980s). The situation in the post-deregulation period is approximated by the
second mortgage regime with a lower downpayment requirement.
What we label as the second regime has long been the standard choice of mod-
eling housing finance in the literature (See, for example, Dı´az and Luengo-Prado
2009, Iacoviello and Pavan 2009, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger 2010, Yang
2009, Li, Liu, and Yao 2009, Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov 2007, Hinter-
maier and Koeniger 2009 and Scoccianti 2009, among others.).
Compared to the previous literature, the advantages of our models are twofold.
Firstly, our set-up allows us to show the net effects of the refinancing options.
Secondly, it helps us decompose the total impact of financial deregulation into
changes that result from lower downpayment requirement and changes that occur
2Both of these ways of refinancing help homeowners to change the payment flow.
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because mortgage loans became more flexible.3 The previous literature has shown
that lower downpayment requirements lead to more collateralized debt and higher
homeownership rate. In addition, we explicitly examined the effect of refinancing
opportunities alone on both mortgage debt and homeownership rate.
Our results show that by deregulating mortgage markets (i.e., by moving from
regime 1 to regime 2), consumption, debt and homeownership rate increase and
as a result savings fall. The driving force is the additional risk-sharing channel
provided by the availability of refinancing opportunities.
Since markets are incomplete, the only way for households to self-insure against
adverse income shocks is by accumulating a noncontingent bond (precautionary
saving). This is the case in regime 1 as well as in regime 2. However, in regime
1, households are forced to increase their home equity as the mortgage matures.
We show that forced-home-equity-saving actually increases the demand for precau-
tionary saving. Intuitively, forced-home-equity-saving imply additional committed
expenditure for all possible states of nature. This mechanism gives homeowners
additional incentive to hold more precautionary savings in order to smooth out
nonhousing consumption.
However, when mortgage deregulation takes place and mortgage market struc-
ture moves from regime 1 to regime 2, homeowners are not forced to build up
home equity over time by following the contracted repayment plan. Moreover,
homeowners can access home equity they accumulated in the past easily and use
home equity to insure themselves against negative income shocks. The demand
for precautionary saving decreases. Therefore, resources will be released for non-
housing consumption.
This implies that households can choose to raise more debt. Homeowners
can borrow against home equity, when negative income shocks occur. Moreover,
anticipating that home equity can be accessed, households are more willing to
accumulate housing stock, compared with households in the traditional mortgage
regime. That increases the debt holding even further, since more households can
borrow and purchase homes. As a result, both the homeownership rate and housing
consumption have increased.
All these effects are amplified when the downpayment requirements become less
strict as well. It should be noted, however, that our results indicate that removing
the forced-home-equity-saving component from the mortgage loan is more relevant
for analyzing the effects of financial deregulation than lowering the downpayment
requirement.
It is important to notice that we keep house prices constant in our analysis.
Thus, the increase in consumption in this model economy does not stem from
3Starting with the seminal work of Jappelli and Pagano 1994, the previous literature has
mainly used the downpayment requirement as a measure for the restrictiveness of mortgage
contracts. Consequently, financial liberalization is modeled as an event that leads to lower
downpayment requirements (See, for example Iacoviello 2008 or most recently Favilukis
et al. 2010 and Scoccianti 2009).
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the “wealth effect.” 4 The evidence on the wealth effect is mixed in empirical
literature. Carroll et al. (2006) estimate that an one-dollar increase in housing
wealth raises consumption by about nine cents, while Lettau and Ludvigson (2004)
conclude that the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth is close
to zero.
In this paper, we do not model fluctuation of housing prices and focus on the
impact of refinancing opportunities to explain the consumption boom. It is a more
important aspect, since homeowners must have access to home equity before they
can take advantage of the increased housing value. Indeed, Doms et al. (2008)
provide empirical evidence for the fact that the linkage between housing wealth
and nonhousing consumption increased after mortgage market deregulation, sug-
gesting that refinancing opportunities play an important role not only for housing
consumption, but also for nonhousing consumption.
Hurst and Stafford (2004) provide further empirical evidence in support of
our hypothesis by showing that households indeed refinance their mortgage for
consumption-smoothing purposes.5 Their empirical evidence lends direct support
for one of the main mechanisms highlighted in our model: mortgage refinancing
plays an important role as a consumption smoothing mechanism, besides the use
of standard precautionary savings.
Precisely and intuitively, refinancing provides an additional channel of risk-
sharing. It allows for state-contingent saving, in the sense that households only
save when income shocks are positive. In the presence of adverse income shocks,
households could borrow by using their home equity as collateral. In contrast, the
traditional mortgage payment plan forces homeowners to save in home equity in
all states of nature.
It should be noted that in the refinancing regime, households rely less on the
precautionary savings for insurance. Or in other words, they substitute the home-
equity risk-sharing channel for the standard precautionary-saving, self-insurance
channel. It is not clear if the over all risk-sharing opportunity would improve
or not. However, our results indicate that total risk-sharing opportunities for
homeowners improve in the refinancing regime.
Similarly, Favilukis et al. (2010) also concluded that housing finance deregula-
tion increases the risk-sharing opportunities in a model with housing production.
In their model, they also showed that both lower downpayment ratios and lower
transaction costs increase households’ access to credit, which helps households to
insure better their idiosyncratic risks. However, they focus on the period between
2000 and 2006, where they implicitly assume that refinancing was available. In
contrast, we compare the period between 1980 and the beginning of new century,
4According to the permanent-income hypothesis, consumption adjusts to the unex-
pected changes in housing wealth induced by changes in housing prices.
5Previously, the housing literature mainly focused on the “financial motivation”of mort-
gage refinancing. And house price and mortgage rate changes were considered to be the
main driver for refinancing activities.
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where mortgage refinancing became increasingly popular. Although we also con-
clude that lowering the effective downpayment ratio helps to increase risk-sharing,
we highlight that the change in mortgage structure alone played a major role in
increasing risk-sharing opportunities.
Hryshko et al. (2009) argue that house prices appreciation helped homeown-
ers to extend their borrowing capacities because the value of their collateral has
increased. We assume that housing prices are constant and stress that the avail-
ability of refinancing itself can provide sizable increase in risk-sharing opportunity,
even when housing prices do not change. It should be noted that increasing house
prices can only provide better risk-sharing in combination with better opportuni-
ties to access home equity. Otherwise, homeowners do not benefit from changes in
their housing wealth.
Thus, our paper also contributes to the literature that argues that risk-sharing
opportunities have improved over the last decades. Krueger and Perri (2006), for
example, argued that the decoupling between income and consumption inequality
points to the fact that market completeness, i.e. the ability of private financial
markets to insure risks, has improved over time. We propose a specific channel
through which financial markets could have provided better risk-sharing opportu-
nities and quantify its relevance. In another important contribution, Heathcote
et al. (2008) depart from the bachelor model of household formation and argue
that risk-sharing within the couple can explain the decoupling between earnings
and consumption inequality. We view their explanation as complementary to ours.
The rest of the paper is comprised of the following sections: In the section
2.2, we document the substantial changes in the U.S. housing market over the
last decades, as well as the institutional background for the changes. We also
present evidence of the decline in saving rates, the consumption boom and the
increase in debt during that period. Section 2.3 presents a simple life-cycle model
with analytical solutions. It shows the main mechanisms, by which the refinancing
opportunities affect the saving rate and risk-sharing among households. Section
2.4 outlines quantitative models that compare the two regimes. Section 2.5 details
the calibration strategy and discusses the main results. Section 2.6 concludes with
recommendations for possible future research.
2.2 Institutional Background: Deregulation,
Mortgage Debt, and Saving Rate from
1980-2000
In this section, we first outline the institutional origins of what is commonly called
“traditional mortgages”, i.e. long-term amortized mortgages that require the mort-
gagee to take an initial equity share at the time of purchase and to accumulate
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further equity as the debt amortizes (typically over a period of 15 to 30 years).
We then present the emergence and popularity of refinancing opportunities in the
last decades.6 We also document the substantial increase in the household debt
holding and the decline in the household saving rate, as well as the associated
“consumption boom”, during the period from 1980 to the beginning of the current
century in the U.S. economy.
2.2.1 Origins of the Long-Term Amortized Mortgage
Structure
The vast majority of homeowners (about 90%) acquire their homes by using long-
term amortized mortgages mortgages, which is considered the “standard” loan
product.
Amortized mortgages originated with the New Deal regulations, with particular
in the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 and the Home Owners’ Loan Act of
1933. These regulations reflected the desire of the Roosevelt administration to
reduce the likelihood of a mass default, which occurred at the beginning of the
Great Depression (Campbell and Hercowitz 2006 and 2009). In particular, the
“forced saving”component of long-term amortized mortgages (i.e., the fact that
homeowners were forced to raise their equity in their homes as the loan amortizes)
was seen as a way to reduce the possibility of systemic default. Before, interest-
only, periodically refinanced mortgages were common, which allowed homeowners
to hold a very low equity share in their homes.
Depression-era regulation was also meant to insulate the mortgage market from
fluctuations in other financial markets (Campbell and Hercowitz 2006 and 2009).
Prior to the 1980s, mortgage loans were almost exclusively issued by thrift institu-
tions (savings and loans). Regulation constrained savings and loans to raise most
of their funds needed to issue mortgage loans by using short-term deposits. This is
referred to as the “maturity mismatch”problem, as lenders were forced to finance
long-term mortgages with short-term liabilities. Moreover, thrift institutions faced
usury laws and interest-rate caps (“Regulation Q”) which restricted the conditions
to which they could borrow and lend (Campbell and Hercowitz 2006 and 2009 and
Gerardi et al. 2006).
2.2.2 Structural Change in the Mortgage Market and
the Emergence of Refinancing Opportunities
The high inflation at the end of the 1970’s and the beginning of the 1980’s made
the New Deal financial regulations untenable. The main reason for the failure was
6We draws heavily on Campbell and Hercowitz(2006,2009) as well as on Gerardi et al.
(2006).
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the maturity mismatch on the balance sheet of the savings and loans institutions.
The fact that savings and loans financed mortgage loans with short-term deposits
made mortgage lending unprofitable, because nominal interest rates on mortgages
were fixed and relatively low compared to the high, nominal interest rates that
were required to attract deposits (Gerardi et al. 2006).
Congress and Presidents Carter and Reagan responded with the Monetary
Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982. As a result, usury
ceilings, interstate banking prohibitions, limits on branching, and Regulation Q,
which capped deposit rates and forbade banks from paying interest on checking
deposits, were abolished. Moreover, state laws that constrained the types of mort-
gage products originators could offer were preempted (Gerardi et al. 2006).
As a result, a process which is often referred to as “financial innovation”began.
This has changed the housing finance system dramatically, increasing the menu of
mortgages available to homeowners considerably. Lenders now offered borrowers
much more flexible repayment schedules.
Instruments for avoiding forced saving already existed before financial deregu-
lation. One could cash-out previously accumulated home equity either by taking
a second mortgage or a home-equity loan or by refinancing the debt with a loan
exceeding the current mortgage balance. However, lack of competition made these
products prohibitively expensive. In contrast, deregulation eliminated legal bar-
riers to entry and was so considerably more competitive (Bennett et al. 2001).
In addition to deregulation, advances in information processing technology also
helped to lower costs by streamlining the mortgage application process (Bennett
et al. 2001).
2.2.3 Mortgage Refinancing over the Last Decades
After the financial deregulation, refinancing activities have been increasingly pop-
ular, and homeowners have been using refinancing as a tool to smooth their con-
sumption when negative income shocks occur.
Using various waves of the SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances), Campbell
and Hercowitz (2009) document a sharp increase in refinancing activities after the
deregulation (See Table 2.1.). In 1983, approximately 10 percent of mortgagees had
refinanced. By 1989, this number had more than doubled, increasing again to 33
percent in 1992. In 1995, it reached almost 41 percent, and it was slightly higher
than that in 1998 and 2001. Campbell and Hercovitz conclude that “mortgage
refinancing went from atypical to commonplace in about 12 years ”(Campbell and
Hercowitz 2009, p.3).7
7Note that the reported numbers are likely to underestimate the true trend of re-
financing activities. Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) measure refinancing activities by
computing the share of those households for which the year of home purchase does not
coincide with the year the oldest mortgage debt was issued. This identification strategy
misses those households who pre-pay (i.e. repay their mortgage loan before maturity) as
these households do not take out a new mortgage.
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Table 2.1: Refinancing Activities and Effective Downpayment
Percent of Mortgagees Average Equity/Value
Year Refinanced at Purchase
1983 9.9 22.6
1989 21.2 23.4
1992 33.0 20.9
1995 40.9 16.9
1998 42.3 16.4
2001 44.4 16.4
Source: From Survey of Consumer Finances
Campbell and Hercowitz (2009)
It is important to study the motives of households who refinance. Some may
refinance their mortgage for consumption smoothing purposes, while others may
simply want to take advantage of lower interest rates.8 Interest rate movements
and expected interest rates movements can explain some of the refinancing activity.
However, as noted by Hurst and Stafford 2004, this explanation cannot account for
fact that there is a significant share of mortgagees who refinance, even if interest
rates are stable or even rising. Stanton (1995) notes that some fixed-rate mortgages
are prepaid even when current market mortgage rates are above the household’s
contracted coupon rate, and some fixed-rate mortgages are not prepaid even when
current market mortgage rates are well below the household’s contracted coupon
rate. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Hurst and Stafford
(2004) find that many households refinance after a negative income shock. They
conclude that the consumption smoothing motive is essential for understanding
refinancing behavior.
Moreover, Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) also provide information about the
development of effective downpayment ratios, i.e., ratio of the average equity rela-
tive to the value of newly purchased homes. Because of the financial deregulation,
borrowers are allowed to take out second and third mortgages easier, and the effec-
tive downpayment ratio declines over time. This is indeed the case, as the second
column of Table 2.1 shows.
In summary, the financial deregulation triggered innovations in the mortgage
market, which helped an increasing number of homeowners to better access their
home equity, both through loan refinancing and lower downpayment ratios.
8The latter motive, which we call “financial motivation ”(Hurst and Stafford 2004),
might be particularly important in an environment with volatile inflation rates that pre-
vailed at the beginning of the 1980s. When current mortgage rates are below the existing
mortgage contract rate, households have an incentive to replace their existing fixed-rate
mortgage with one at a lower rate. The benefit to the household is a present value of
wealth gain.
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2.2.4 Household Mortgage Debt
Following the financial deregulation, mortgage debt began to grow. Mortgage debt
relative to average labor income increased by more than 15 times, if we compare
data from the 1983 and the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). In our
calculation, mortgage debt includes primary mortgages, home equity loans, home
equity lines of credit and labor income including wage income and income from
self-employment.
It is interesting to see that mortgage debt grew not only in absolute terms,
but also relative to the value of houses: the ratio of mortgage debt to the value of
owner-occupied homes was 0.31 in 1982, 0.37 in 1990, and 0.42 in 1995. Since 1995,
it has fluctuated around this higher level (see Campbell and Hercowitz 2009).
During the 1990s, not only mortgage debt, but also financial assets have grown
rapidly. This suggests that many households may have used refinancing opportuni-
ties to leverage their financial market activities, instead of using these opportunities
as a buffer for consumption. We thus also compute the net debt, defined as finan-
cial assets minus mortgage debt, if the difference is negative. If the households
are in negative net financial position, they are net borrowers in this economy. We
suspect that net borrowers are more likely to use mortgage debt for the purpose
of consumption smoothing. Therefore, this measure is closer to the purpose of our
study.
We find that net debt has grown as well, although less dramatic than mortgage
debt. The fraction of the population that is in net debt has grown by 7 percentage
points, and net financial debt relative to average labor income has grown from
123% to 160% between 1983 and 2004. This result can be interpreted as the
average mortgage position in the economy.9 Our definitions of debt, assets and
income follow those used by Kennickell et al. in the SCF bulletin.10
These findings provide further evidence of the fact that mortgage debt rose
and that it was increasingly used to finance consumption, either in form of housing
services or in form of nonhousing consumption. As the next section shows, the
increase in (net) debt indeed coincided with a rise in aggregate consumption.
2.2.5 The Decline of the Household Saving Rate and
Consumption Boom
The U.S. economy experienced a decline in the household saving rate in the past
decades. There are different definitions of household saving rate; however the
decline is quite robust regardless of the definitions. For example, the private
9Notice, however, that our measure of income does not correspond to GDP.
10It should be noted that the 1983 is only partially comparable with the other SCF
waves because of a change in sample design and in the questionnaire.
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saving rate was at its post-1950 average level of 17.6 percent as recently as 1993,
but it dropped to 13.1 percent at the very end of 1990’s, reaching its lowest level
in nearly 50 years.
At the meantime, it witnessed an even more dramatic decrease in the personal
saving rate. Guidolin and Jeunesse (2007) document this change and argue that
the decline in the personal saving rate is a very robust fact, despite measurement
issues.11 According to NIPA, it has dropped from 9.8 percent in the 1980 to
roughly 2.9 in the 2000.
Although a wealth of evidence shows household saving rate declines substan-
tially, National Income and Product Account (NIPA) definitions of saving rates
do not directly correspond to the economics concepts, as Parker (1999) points
out. Instead, it is simpler and more useful to exam the other side of the coin,
namely the consumption share of national output. Consistent with those findings
regarding the saving rate, it is documented that the consumption share of GDP
has increased by 6 percentage points from 1980 to 2000. This increase itself is
striking and seems even more pronounced by comparing the period from 1950 to
1980 where the consumption-GDP ratio was roughly constant. NIPA also shows
that personal consumption expenditure accounted for 87.7% of personal disposable
income in 1980 and the ratio has increased to 93.2% in 2000.
It is also important to note that NIPA data measures a broader definition
of consumption, namely consumption expenditure. It includes both consumption
(non-durable consumption plus services, including housing services) and durable
goods expenditures (excluding housing). The expenditures on durable goods in-
creased only by 0.1% from 1980 to 2000. Obviously, it is not sufficient to explain the
consumption boom. On the other hand, data suggest that the share of non-durable
consumption plus the services (including housing services) increases substantially.
In other words, in order to account for the increase in substantial increase in the
consumption share, one must explain why non-durable consumption and services
increases substantially.
Even though a consensus of researchers believe that the dramatic decrease in
the household saving rate is quite substantial, what has triggered this decline in
the saving rate and increase in consumption share has remained a hot issue.
Among alternative explanations (wealth effect created by stock market bubbles,
change in demographic structure, an increase in the discount rate, etc.), Feldstein
(2008) hypothesizes that mortgage refinancing with equity withdrawal is one of
the major drivers of the decline in the household saving rate. The consumer’s
ability to borrow is both enhanced by financial innovations which allow consumers
purchase a house with lower downpayment requirements and financial instruments
which help homeowners access home equity. In contrast, Parker (1999) is more
conservative about this mechanism and argues that the channel alone can only
11Personal savings is defined as one minus the ratio of personal outlays to disposable
income. Personal outlays is the sum of the consumption expenditures plus interest paid
by persons and personal transfer payments abroad.
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explain a limited part of the increase in consumption share, if any. This paper
tries to quantitatively evaluate the impact of financial liberalization on the decline
in the saving rate and the consumption boom.
2.3 Simplified Economy
In the previous section, we outlined the institutional origins of traditional mort-
gage loans. In particular, we showed that traditional mortgage loans imply that
homeowners are forced to accumulate equity as the loan matures (“forced saving”).
Moreover, under the traditional mortgage regime, homeowners cannot access the
home equity they accumulated in the past (“lock-in effect”). By making use of
refinancing opportunities, homeowners can avoid accumulating equity in the first
place or they can tap the home equity they accumulated in the past easier.
In this section, we analyze to what extent refinancing opportunities change
the saving choice of homeowners and affect their risk-sharing opportunities. We
will demonstrate that precautionary saving under the traditional mortgage regime
is higher than that under the refinancing regime. Intuitively, this is because the
features of the traditional mortgage contract amplify the impact of earnings uncer-
tainty. We show, however, that, despite the fact that households accumulate more
savings for consumption smoothing purposes in the traditional mortgage regime,
households enjoy better risk-sharing in the refinancing regime.
Our analysis in this section is based on a simplistic life-cycle model which
permits an analytical solution. In the next section, we present a quantitative
model that incorporates more realistic life-cycle features and institutional details.
That model, however, does not allow for an analytical solution. With the help of
numerical methods, we will show that the main conclusions that we derive from this
simple model still hold, and more importantly, they are quantitatively relevant.
2.3.1 Environment
We consider a simple life cycle economy, which is populated by a continuum of
ex-ante identical households. Household take the interest rate, r, as given (partial
equilibrium).
Each household lives for three periods, t = 1, 2, 3. The household receives labor
income in the first two periods and pension benefits in the last period. Labor
income in the first period, y1 = 1, is deterministic. Income in the second period is
uncertain and given by y2 = 1 ± , where positive (+) and negative (−) shocks
occur with the same probability, 0.5. Moreover, shocks are uncorrelated across
individuals. Retirement is denoted by yr, that is, y3 = yr.
Households receive period utility, u(ct, ht), from consuming housing services ht
and nonhousing consumption ct. We impose the restrictions ct > 0 and ht > 0.
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Utility is separable across time. Total lifetime utility is thus given by
U = E0
3∑
t=1
βt−1u(ct, ht).
We further assume that period utility is separable across good, i.e., u(ct, ht) =
u(ct) + u(ht). We assume households are risk-averse and prudent, namely, u
′(.) >
0,u′′(.) < 0 and u′′′(.) > 0. For simplicity, we assume the interest rate r = 0 and
the discount factor β = 1.
In this simple economy, we highlight the impact of the traditional mortgage
loan structure by making the following assumptions. Households are required to
be homeowners. At the beginning of their life cycle, they buy a house of size h¯
through a mortgage loan. Households are not allowed to adjust the size of their
housing size over the life cycle. We further assume that the housing stock does
not depreciate and can be fully collateralized. Note, that these assumptions are
relaxed in the quantitative model. 12
2.3.2 Mortgage Loans
A house of size h is financed by a collateralized mortgage loan of size d. When
households enter the economy, the mortgage loan is fully collateralized, and the
initial mortgage loan is d1 = h
∗.
We consider the following two different mortgage regimes:
1. Traditional Mortgage: The bank requires repayment of the mortgage during
the first period, and households cannot access their home equity afterwards:
dt = 0 if t ≥ 2. In the following, we will label this regime as “no refinancing
(NR) ”.
2. Refinancing: Households can choose the payment stream, hence 0 ≤ dt ≤ h∗.
We will also label this regime as “refinancing (R) ”.
Regime 1 characterizes the payment requirement of the traditional mortgage
loan. Regime 2 instead allows households to choose the payment stream of the
mortgage debt. In extreme, households can choose not to repay their mortgage
debt until the last period.
12In quantitative models, households are free to choose their housing consumption (i.e.,
the exact size of h). There will be transaction costs, so that changing owner-occupied
housing is costly. Moreover, households can also decide whether they want to obtain
their housing services from owner-occupied housing or by renting. And also the housing
stock can only be fully collateralized. We will also relax the assumption regarding the
separability of preferences across housing and nonhousing consumption.
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Since un-collateralized borrowing is not allowed, households accumulate finan-
cial assets, a ≥ 0, for consumption smoothing purpose. For simplicity, we define
net financial assets a˜t ≡ at− dt. We assume that initially, financial wealth is zero,
i.e. a1 = 0 and a˜1 = −d1.
2.3.3 The Household’s Problem
We now state the household’s maximization problem backwards at each period of
the life cycle.
Period 3: We start with the last period (Period 3). The optimization prob-
lem reads as follows:
max
c3
u (c3) + u (h
∗) ,
c3 + h
∗ = a˜3 + yr + h∗,
where c3 is the household’s consumption at Period 3. Notice that in the tra-
ditional mortgage case, a˜3
NR gives both the net and the total financial assets
(a˜3
NR = aNR3 ), because d3 = 0. In the refinancing case instead, a˜3
R might be
negative, as long as a˜3
R ≥ −h∗.
Period 2: In Period 2, household’s problem reads,
max
c2
u (c2) + u (h
∗) + u (c3) + u (h∗) ,
c2,i + h
∗ = a˜2 + y2,i − a˜3 + h∗.
The second period’s income is uncertain, as income shocks can be good (i = g
and y2g = 1 + ) or bad (i = b and y2b = 1 − ). The two mortgage regimes
imply different constraints for net financial wealth. Under the traditional mortgage
regime where homeowners cannot access their home equity, a˜3
NR ≥ 0. In contrast,
under the refinancing regime, a˜3
R ≥ −h∗.
Period 1: The household’s optimization problem in the first period reads
as follows:
max
c1
u (c1) + u (h
∗) + E (u (c2) + u (h∗) + u (c3) + u (h∗)) .
such that
c1 + h
∗ = y1 − a˜2 + h∗ + a˜1.
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Notice that for simplicity, we assume that y1 is deterministic. Similarly, the
traditional mortgage regime requires a˜2
NR ≥ 0, whereas in the refinancing regime,
a˜2
R ≥ −h∗. Recall that the initial holding of financial wealth is zero, i.e. a1 = 0
or a˜1 = −h∗ in both regimes.
2.3.4 Results
We need to make an additional assumption on housing size and income profile to
make this problem interesting.
Assumption 1. y1 > h
∗ > y2b + y1 − yr.
This assumption states that the size of the initial mortgage is large relative
to the lifetime income that a homeowner receives if the second period’s income
realization turns out to be bad. And it is smaller than the income in the first
period. This assumption also implies yr > y2b.
With assumption 1, we can show the following result:
Lemma 1. In the traditional mortgage regime, the upper bound on household’s
saving at the end of period 1 is a˜2
NR < yr − y2b.
In other words, this Lemma gives a˜2
NR + y2b < yr. It means that in the tradi-
tional mortgage regime, if the income realization turns out to be bad, households
have incentive to borrow against future income.
Result 1. Homeowners in the traditional mortgage regime will have net financial
assets that exceed those of homeowners in the refinancing regime at period 2,
a˜2
NR > a˜2
R.
That is, the net financial assets of homeowners at the beginning of the second
period are higher in the traditional mortgage regime as compared to the refinancing
regime.
This is what we call the “forced-saving effect”of traditional mortgage loans. It
is important to notice that it hinges on the Lemma (1). The fact that homeowners
in the traditional mortgage regime have an incentive to borrow but cannot cause
an excess amount of savings in the first period with respect to the refinancing
regime.
With Lemma (1) and Result (1), we show the “lock-in effect”. Precisely, since
borrowing is not possible at Period 2, optimal consumption choices in Period 2
and 3 are
cNR2b = y2b + a˜2
NR,
and
cNR3 = yr,
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In contrast, consumption choices under refinancing regime,
cR2b = c
R
3 =
y2b + yr + a˜2
R
2
.
In the traditional regime, consumption in Period 2 and Period 3 do not co-
incide, if the income shock turns out to be bad. On the other hand, refinancing
opportunities allow households to achieve a flat consumption profile, given the
negative shock realized in Period 2.
It is interesting to note that although households in the traditional mortgage
regime accumulate more net financial wealth than households in the refinancing
regime, they do not achieve a smooth consumption profile between Period 2 and
Period 3. In other words, households in the refinancing regime save less but the fact
that they can access home equity in Period 2 allows them to achieve a smoother
consumption stream.
We now show that our findings have important implications for the ability
of homeowners to share income risk. We measure the degree of risk-sharing by
the dispersion of consumption across the various income realizations in period 2.
In our economy, because utility is concave, perfect risk-sharing would imply that
consumption is equal across all states of the income process. That is, the higher
the degree of risk-sharing, the lower the dispersion of consumption.13
The next result then suggests that risk-sharing is better in the refinancing
regime.
Result 2. The dispersion of consumption in Period 2 is greater for homeowners
in the traditional mortgage regime compared to the dispersion of consumption in
the refinancing regime.
cNR2g − cNR2b > cR2g − cR2b.
This finding is very interesting. It implies that, despite the fact that home-
owners in the traditional mortgage regime accumulate more financial assets than
homeowners in the refinancing regime, they actually achieve less risk-sharing. Put
differently, when financial markets are deregulated, we would expect to see a de-
cline in saving and a decrease in consumption variability, which is quantitatively
consistent with the trends in the U.S. economy. In the next section, we present a
quantitative model that allows us to evaluate the quantitative importance of this
effect.
13In the quantitative model that we present in the next section, we measure the dis-
persion of consumption by variance of the percentage deviation of consumption from its
mean.
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2.4 Quantitative Model
2.4.1 Households
We consider an economy with one unit mass of finite-lived households, aged from
0 to J . Households face mortality risk along the life span, and the conditional
probability of surviving is ψj ∈ (0, 1). The newborn, therefore, survive until age
j′, with a probability of Πj
′
j=0 ψj+1. The population size of households at age j is
µj .
14
Each household supplies inelastic labor, l, each period to the firm in final
production sector until retirement age, j∗. Age specific productivity is vj , which
is the mean log-normal income of the j-year old. Additionally households face
uninsurable income risks when they work. Individual i’s period-specific earning
shock is eit at period t. And the law of motion of the earning risk is standard
AR(1): et+1 = ρ · et + εt, where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the persistence and εt is the white
noise with a standard deviation σe. A worker’s gross labor income in period t
and age j, is wt · et · vj , where wt is the wage rate. Working households pay tax
on their gross labor income, and the tax rate is τt. Retired households receive a
pension benefit, p, from the government. Therefore, the labor or pension income
for household i in period t is yi,t, and
yi,t =
{
(1− τ) · wt · eit · vj · l
p
j < j∗
j ≥ j∗.
Another source of income for households is the return of their financial assets,
a. The interest rate in this economy is rt at period t, and the gross return is (1+r).
Households value the consumption of a nondurable goods and housing services
that can be obtained on the rental market or through home ownership. Precisely,
households derive period utility, u(c, hs), from two types of consumption: non-
durable consumption goods, c, and housing services, hs. Households can either
consume housing services by rental a house (of size f) from the renting market, or
housing service provided by their own housing stock, h,
hs = z · h+ (1− z) · f,
where z is an index function, taking value 1 and 0: z = 1 for households being
homeowners and z = 0 for being renters. Moreover, lifetime utility is discounted
every period at a rate of β > 0.
14We assume households do not have bequest motives and leave remaining net worth as
“terminal consumption”, e.g. funeral and medical expenses (Favilukis et al. (2010)).
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The depreciation rate for homeowner’s housing stock is δo. And we assume
that the homeowners pay δo · h for maintaining their homes15. The depreciation
rate for renting a house is δr.
Households can buy and sell houses in the housing market with transaction
costs, which are in proportion to the housing size(s) they sell and/or buy, tr (h′, h),
and
tr
(
h′, h
)
= (1− I(h = h′)) · (τs · h+ τb · h′).
where τs and τb are the proportions of transaction fees to the housing values
homeowners sell and buy respectively. I(x) is an indicator function, which takes
value one if the relation x is true, and zero otherwise.
2.4.2 Market Arrangement
There are no state-contingent markets for the household-specific shocks and the
set of financial assets is exogenously determined. In particular, there is only one
financial asset, a bond, which pays interest independent of the realizations of in-
come shocks. Therefore, households cannot fully insure against their idiosyncratic
risks. They can only self-insure by saving, using bonds.
2.4.3 Government
The government taxes labor income and redistributes the revenue to the retired.
Specifically, the government transfers pension benefit, p , to each retiree, in every
period. Labor taxes τt are adjusted such that the government’s budget is balanced.
2.4.4 Firm in the Goods Sector
There is one single-good in this economy, which is produced by a representative
firm in the goods sector. The production technology is standard Cobb-Douglas,
Y = Kα · L1−α
where K represents aggregate capital, L aggregate labor demand and Y the
output in the goods sector. Aggregate capital depreciates at a rate of δk. In
this economy, aggregate labor supply is exogenous and determined by the age-
specific productivity and the idiosyncratic productivity of households in this whole
economy. Since there is no aggregate risk, the aggregate labor supply is constant
in this economy.
15In other words, we assume that homeowners have to maintain all the depreciated part
of the housing stock they own.
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2.4.5 Renting Market, Housing Market and Financial
Sector
There is a competitive financial intermediary sector with a large number of risk
neutral financial firms. Competition among those firms drives profit to zero in
equilibrium.
Financial firms collect savings from both foreign and domestic households. We
denote the aggregate deposits from domestic households Ad and the aggregate
foreign deposits Af .
Financial firms can transform households’ financial assets into productive cap-
ital, residential capital and owner-occupied housing stock, on a one-to-one basis
without any adjustment costs. Therefore, the relative price between productive
capital and housing stock/residental capital, as well as the relative price between
productive capital and consumption are always one. K is the capital rented to
the representative firm that produces final goods. Residential housing, F , is the
total supply in the renting market to the renters. Financial firms also construct
owner-occupied homes and sell them to households. Households can also borrow
from financial firms, using housing stock as collateral. In other words, financial
firms can issue mortgages to homeowners.16 We denote the aggregate mortgage
loan D. Table 2.2 presents the balance sheet of this sector.
Table 2.2: Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
Productive capital, K Domestic deposits, Ad
Mortgage loans, D Foreign deposits, Af
Residential capital, F
For simplicity, borrowing and lending rates are assumed to be the same, r.
Therefore, net return to mortgage loan is r. The no-arbitrage condition implies
that in equilibrium, the financial firms must be indifferent between renting pro-
ductive capital to the firm, offering mortgage loans to homeowners and lending
residential housing to renters. Therefore, the rental rate of capital is r + δk, and
renting price must be equal to the sum of the depreciation of renting and the
interest rate, i.e., rf = r + δr.
Following Henderson and Ioannides (1983), we assume that δr > δo. This
implies that in equilibrium, the price for renting is higher than the user cost of
16For example, a household who wants to buy a house of value h, pays h to a financial
firm to purchase the house. The financial firm constructs a home of value h and sells it
to the household. The household can also borrow from the financial firm to finance his
purchase, using the housing stock as collateral. The loan from the financial firm to the
household is the collateralized mortgage loan.
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owner-occupied housing, r + δr > r + δo. This provides incentives for households
to become homeowners. It is important to notice that without this incentive,
no household would choose to become a homeowner in this model, since renting
strictly dominates owning, ceteris paribus. This is because housing services ac-
quired from the rental market do not involve frictions related to housing, such
as transaction costs, downpayment requirements or mortgage payments. Our as-
sumption that rental housing depreciates at a higher rate than owner-occupied
housing can be justified with moral-hazard on the side of the tenant.
2.4.6 Mortgage Structures
This subsection characterizes mortgage payment structures and the household’s
problems accordingly. To provide a stylized contrast between mortgage market
arrangements prevailing in the U.S. economy before and after deregulation, we
focus on two polar cases: 1) households purchase home through traditional, fixed-
term level payment mortgage contracts but cannot refinance; and 2) households
can refinance without any cost.
Our modeling strategy is as follows. In both cases, purchasing a house requires
a downpayment, which is proportional to the home’s value. This downpayment
ratio is denoted by φ1. The difference between the two polar cases lies in the
flexibility of the two types of payment schedules. Without refinancing opportunity,
households have to accumulate home equity as the payment schedule specifies. In
contrast, with refinancing opportunities, households can “rewrite”the mortgage
contract to choose the payment stream over the contract period. Moreover they
can also borrow from the financial intermediary sector, using housing stock they
accumulate as collateral.
Traditional Mortgage: Fixed-Term, Level-Payment Mortgage
Homeowners in this model acquire their home equity with a fixed-payment or
fixed-rate mortgage. To model this mortgage contract, we closely follow Chambers
et al. (2009a, 2009b). We use similar techniques to formalize the constant payment
schedule, which is an important feature of the traditional mortgage regime.
The fixed-term, level payment mortgage loan requires homeowners make con-
stant mortgage payments over the length of the mortgage contract. It implies
an increasing amortization schedule of the principal and a decreasing schedule for
interest payments. Specifically, the initial debt level is d0, when acquiring a new
house, d0 = (1− φ1) ·h′, where h′ is the size of the purchased house. The constant
payment each period is m = λ · d0, where λ is a constant number which balances
the principal and interest payment schedules. In other words, it is pinned down by
the mortgage rate and the length of maturity, or λ = r ·
[
1− (1 + r)−T
]−1
, where
r is mortgage rate and the T is the length of the mortgage contract. Therefore the
housing debt evolves as follows:
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dt = dt−1 · (1 + r)−m.
As stressed before, there is no refinancing opportunity in this type of contract,
and homeowners constantly reduce the housing debt level until they own all of the
home equity, unless they sell the house before the contract ends.
Homeowners could sell their houses or upgrade or downgrade their housing
stock holdings. If homeowners sell their houses and become renters, part of the
housing value is used for repaying the remaining debt, and homeowners keep the
home equity they have accumulated in the past. Similarly, if the homeowners
upgrade or downgrade their housing stock holdings, the initial contract is cleared
and they must sign a new contract with new debt holding.
To characterize the household’s decision in this environment, we introduce
another state variable, residual time s, which represents the length of maturity
(the number of periods) left before the contract ends. On the one hand, the
residual time, s, represents the debt position information of the homeowner. On
the other hand, it helps to distinguish different types of households in this economy.
For example, if s = 0 (residual time is zero) and h = 0 (housing stock holding is
zero) for households, it implies they are renters in this economy. If s = 0 (residual
time is zero) and h > 0 (housing stock holding is positive), it implies they are
homeowners who own the house without any debt. Moreover, If s > 0 (residual
time is positive) and h > 0 (housing stock holding is positive), it implies they are
homeowners who own the part of the house that has a positive debt position.
Generally, in this economy, households, either renters or homeowners, choose
consumption of nondurable goods and asset holding. If households choose to be-
come homeowners (or upgrade/downgrade their housing stock), they also decide
on the size of the rental unit. If they choose to become renters (or continue to be
renters), they have to decide on the size of the rental unit as well. If homeowners
stay in their own house, without changing housing size, they consume housing ser-
vices generated by the housing stock they own and do not need to choose housing
size.
Imagine that the homeowners in this economy are hit by negative income
shocks. They could be able to use liquid financial assets - deposits - to smooth their
consumption. For homeowners with low liquid assets, they can sell or downgrade
their housing stock with a positive transaction cost. In other words, they cannot
utilize the home equity accumulated in their homes, unless they sell their houses.
Because of the transaction cost, there is an “inaction zone”where homeowners
with low liquid assets do not adjust their housing stock, even after being hit by
a negative income shock. Even in that case, they must pay the mortgage loan as
scheduled, namely the committed expenditures. In this case, they have to adjust
their consumption to a lower level.
Household’s problem Households choose (z′, c, a′, h′, f) to maximize,
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Vj (e, a, h, s) = max
c,hs,a′,s′,z′
{
u (c, hs) + ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, h′, s′
)}
,
where c > 0, a′ > 0, h′ > h
¯
, f > 0, s′ > 0, z′ = 1 or 0. Note that we assume
the minimum housing size in this economy is h
¯
. In other words, homeowners can
choose housing size between [h
¯
,∞].
The law of motion for s, especially needs elaboration. For households who
were renters yesterday and become homeowners today, s = 0 and s′ = T . For
households who were renters yesterday and are still renters today, s = 0 and
s′ = 0. For households who were homeowners yesterday and become renters today,
s > 0 and s′ = 0. For households who were homeowners yesterday and upgrade or
downgrade their housing today, s > 0 and s′ = T .
The choice is subject to the following budget constraint,
c+ a′ +
(
1− z′) · rf · f + tr (h′, h)+ λ · (1− φ1) · h · I (s > 0) · I (h = h′)
+ φ1 · h′ ·
(
z · (1− I (h = h′))+ (1− z))+ δo · h · z · I (h = h′)+ δo · h′ · z′ · (1− I (h = h′))
= w · e · vj · (1− I (j > j∗)) + p · I (j > j∗) + (1 + r) · a+ z · (h− dT−s) ·
(
1− I (h = h′)) .
where indicator function I (x) takes value one if the relation x is true, and zero
otherwise. Left-hand side of the equation gives the spending decisions households
make, while the right hand side gives household’s resources. All the households
have to decide on consumption c, and asset holding, a′. If households choose to
become renters for this period, z′ = 0, they have to choose the size of the rental
unit, f . And if homeowners choose to upgrade or downgrade their housing stock
or become renters, they decide on housing size, h′ or renting size, f . A transaction
cost, tr (h′, h), has to be paid by households, who make housing transactions. If
they are homeowners at the beginning of this period and decide not to move,
I (h = h′) = 1, they make mortgage payments, λ · (1− φ1) ·h, conditional on their
mortgage contract has not been finished, I (s > 0) = 1. Otherwise, homeowners
pay zero in mortgage payments. Homeowners at the beginning of this period
who want to upgrade and downgrade their housing, pay a new downpayment for
the new house they buy during this period. The same is true for renters at the
beginning of this period who choose to become homeowners. Homeowners who do
not want to move, must maintain their house by paying δo · h. Movers and new
home owners, must maintain the newly purchased house, δo · h′.
The right-hand side of the budget constraint describes household resources.
The working cohorts of households receive labor income of w ·e ·vj , and the retired
cohorts receive pension benefits of p. All of them receive returns on the asset
holding (1 + r) · a, unless the asset position is zero. For homeowners who want
to move, they need to sell their house and clear up the housing debt, if any. The
rest become resources for them to use, h − dT−s. The household problem can be
decomposed into several distinct situations.
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Renters who continue to be renters Suppose that the household is
a renter at the beginning of the period and continues to be a renter during this
period again. The housing stock holding is simply zero both at the beginning and
at the end of the period, that is h = 0 and h′ = 0. The renter only needs to decide
on renting size f and there is no mortgage-related expenditures. Denote the labor
income or pension income as ye,j = w · e · vj · (1− I (j > j∗)) + p · I (j > j∗). The
recursive form of the decision problem is stated as follows:
Vj (e, a, 0, 0) = max
c,f,a′
{
u (c, f) + ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, 0, 0
)}
s.t.
c+ a′ + rf · f = ye,j + (1 + r) · a.
Homeowners who are becoming renters Suppose that the household
is a homeowner at the beginning of the period and chooses to be a renter during
this period. The housing stock is positive both at the beginning of the period
and zero at the end of the period, that is h > 0 and h′ = 0. The household only
needs to decide on renting size f . The difference from the last case is that the
homeowner needs to sell the house he owns and repays the debt he owes to the
bank, h − dT−s. At the meantime a transaction cost is incurred, tr (0, h). The
recursive form of the decision problem is stated as follows:
Vj (e, a, h, s) = max
c,f,a′
{
u (c, f) + ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, 0, 0
)}
.
s.t.
c+ a′ + rf · f + tr (0, h) = ye,j + (1 + r) · a+ h− dT−s.
Homeowners who choose to stay Suppose that the household is a
homeowner at the beginning of the period and chooses to stay in his own house
during this period. The housing stock is positive both at the beginning of the
period and remains the same at the end of the period, that is h = h′. The
household does not need to decide on the housing size. The home owner needs to
maintain the house and pay δo · h. If the standard contract is not finished yet, or
s > 0, he also has to make the mortgage payment, λ · (1− φ1) · h. If he owes the
entire home equity or s = 0, he need not pay the mortgage. The recursive form of
the decision problem is stated as follows:
Vj (e, a, h, s) = max
c,a′
{
u (c, h) + ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, h,max (s− 1, 0))}
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s.t.
c+ a′ + λ · (1− φ1) · h · I (s > 0) + δo · h = ye,j + (1 + r) · a.
Homeowners who upgrade or downgrade Suppose that the house-
hold is a homeowner at the beginning of the period and chooses to upgrade or
downgrade his housing stock during this period. The housing stock is positive
both at the beginning and at the end of the period, although they are not the
same, that is h 6= h′. The household needs to decide on the housing size, h′. The
homeowner first needs to sell the house he owns and repays the debt he owes to the
bank. The remaining equity is h− dT−s. He has to start a new mortgage contract
to buy a new house. Therefore, the state variable which keeps track of the number
of periods left before the mortgage contract finishes, is reset to T . He has to pay
a downpayment for the new house, φ1 · h′, the transaction cost incurred, tr (h′, h),
and the maintenance fee, δo · h′. The recursive form of the decision problem is
stated as follows:
Vj (e, a, h, s) = max
c,h′,a′
{
u
(
c, h′
)
+ ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, h′, T
)}
s.t.
c+ a′ + tr
(
h′, h
)
+ φ1 · h′ + δo · h′ = ye,j + (1 + r) · a+ h− dT−s.
Renters who are becoming homeowners Suppose that the household
is a renter at the beginning of the period and chooses to be a homeowner during
this period. The housing stock at the beginning of this period is zero and positive
at the end of this period, that is h = 0 and h′ > 0,respectively. He needs to decide
on the housing size. He has to make a downpayment for the new house, φ1 ·h′, the
transaction cost incurred, tr (h′, 0) and the maintenance fee, δo · h′. The recursive
form of the decision problem is stated as follows:
Vj (e, a, 0, 0) = max
c,h′,a′
{
u
(
c, h′
)
+ ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, h′, T
)}
.
s.t.
c+ a′ + tr
(
h′, 0
)
+ φ1 · h′ + δo · h′ = ye,j + (1 + r) · a.
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Flexible Refinancing
This subsection details the other polar case, that is, homeowners have options to
refinance. Refinancing in this model is defined broadly. Except for changing down-
payment ratio (or the initial home equity holding), all the refinancing activities,
including taking additional mortgage loans and negotiating payment schedules are
considered. This definition implies homeowners would be able to alter the monthly
payments owed on the loan, or by altering the loan’s term of maturity.. One could
think of a case in which homeowners can sign a new contract at the end of ev-
ery period (periodically refinancing). Moreover, they can also borrow from the
financial intermediary by using their home equity as collateral. In essence, home-
owners can access collateral lending, subject to the constraint that mortgage debt
does not to exceed a certain limit. Downpayment is considered as the minimum
home equity, which must be owned by the homeowner. We adopt the assumption
that total borrowing cannot exceed a fraction, 1 − φ1, of home value. This as-
sumption has been widely used in the housing literature (for example, Diaz and
Luengo-Prado(2008)). Therefore, a homeowner’s debt evolves as follows:
d′ 6 (1− φ1) · h′.
Imagine that the homeowners in this economy are hit by negative income
shocks. They could use liquid financial assets - deposit - to smooth their consump-
tion. For homeowners with low liquid assets, they could also make use of the home
equity they have accumulated, without selling their house. It is the refinancing
channel of consumption smoothing.
Household’s problem Households choose (z′, c, a′, h′, f) to maximize,
Vj (e, a, h, d) = max
c,hs,a′,z′
{
u (c, hs) + ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, h′, d′
)}
where c > 0, a′ > 0, h′ > h
¯
, f > 0, z′ = 1 or 0. Technically, comparing with
the previous case, we can see that the state variable s is not being useful for
homeowners to make their decision, since households could refinance any time
when they need to. The budget constraint for households is the following:
c+ a′ + (r + 1) · d · I (h = h′)+ (1− z′) · rf · f + tr (h′, h)
+ h′ · (z · (1− I (h = h′))+ (1− z))+ δo · [h · z · I (h = h′)+ ·h′ · z′ · (1− I (h = h′))]
= w · e · vj · (1− I (j > j∗)) + p · I (j > j∗) + r · a+ (h · z − d) ·
(
1− I (h = h′))+ d′.
The left-hand side of equation provides spending decisions of households. All
the households have to decide on consumption c, and asset holding, a′. If house-
holds choose to become renters for this period, z′ = 0, they have to choose the
66
AND RISK-SHARING
size of the rental unit, f . And if homeowners choose to upgrade or downgrade
their housing stock or become renters, they decide on housing size, h′, or renting
size, f . Households, that make housing transactions, must pay a transaction cost,
tr (h′, h). If they are homeowners at the beginning of this period and decide not to
move, I (h = h′) = 1, they service mortgage debt they hold by paying r · d. Home-
owners at the beginning of this period who want to upgrade or downgrade their
housing pay h′ for the new house. This is the same for renters at the beginning of
this period who choose to become homeowners. Homeowners who do not want to
move must maintain their house by paying δo · h. Movers and new home owners
must maintain the newly purchased house, δo · h′.
The right-hand side of the budget constraint provides the household’s re-
sources. The working cohorts of households receive labor income w · e · vj , and
the retired cohorts receive pension benefit of p. All of them receive returns on the
asset holding (1 + r) · a, unless the asset position is zero. Homeowners who want
to move must sell their house and clear up the remaining debt. The rest becomes
resources for them to use, h − d. Homeowners are also free to choose a new debt
level, d′. Several distinct situations can be also laid out as follows.
Renters who continue to be renters Suppose that the household is
a renter at the beginning of the period and continues to be a renter during this
period as well. The housing stock is simply zero both at the beginning and at the
end of the period, that is h = 0 and h′ = 0. The renter only needs to decide on
renting size f . Technically, the form of mortgage contract does not affect this type
of households. The recursive form of the decision problem is stated as follows:
Vj (e, a, 0, 0) = max
c,f,a′
{
u (c, f) + ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, 0, 0
)}
s.t.
c+ a′ + rf · f = ye,j + (1 + r) · a.
Homeowners who are becoming renters Suppose that the household
is a homeowner at the beginning of the period and chooses to be a renter during
this period. The housing stock is positive both at the beginning of the period and
zero at the end of the period, that is h > 0 and h′ = 0. The household only needs
to decide on renting size f . The difference from the last case is that the homeowner
needs to sell the house he owns and repays the debt he owes to the bank. The
remaining equity is h − d. The new debt level is zero, since he chooses to be a
renter this period. At the meanwhile, a transaction cost is incurred, tr (0, h). It
It appears that the form of mortgage contract does not take effect on households
in this situation. However, implicitly, homeowners might be less likely to choose
to be renters in the current market arrangement than homeowners who have no
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refinancing opportunities in the previous case, given reasonable negative income
shocks. They could choose to stay and refinance, unless they are close to the
borrowing limit. The recursive form of the decision problem is stated as follows:
Vj (e, a, h, d) = max
c,f,a′
{
u (c, f) + ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, 0, 0
)}
s.t.
c+ a′ + rf · f + tr (0, h) = ye,j + (1 + r) · a+ h− d.
Homeowners who choose to stay Suppose that the household is a
homeowner at the beginning of the period and chooses to stay in his own house
during this period. The housing stock is positive both at the beginning of the
period and remains the same at the end of the period, that is h = h′. The
household does not need to decide on the housing size. He needs to maintain
the house and pay, δo · h. Unlike the traditional mortgage case, where he makes
a constant mortgage payment and cannot change the debt holding, there is no
committed payment to fulfill and he can adjust the debt level. However, he has to
pay the interest on the existing debt. The recursive form of the decision problem
is stated as follows:
Vj (e, a, h, d) = max
c,a′
{
u (c, h) + ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, h, d′
)}
s.t.
c+ a′ + (1 + r) · d+ δo · h = ye,j + r · a+ d′,
d′ 6 (1− φ1) · h.
Homeowners who upgrade or downgrade Suppose that the house-
hold is a homeowner at the beginning of the period and chooses to upgrade or
downgrade his housing stock during this period. The housing stock is positive
both at the beginning and at the end of the period, although they are not the
same, that is h 6= h′. The household needs to decide on the housing size, h′. The
homeowner first needs to sell the house he owns and repay the debt he owes to the
bank. The remaining equity is h− d. He has to pay for the new house. He could
choose to borrow against home equity, and he decides on the new debt level, d′. A
transaction cost incurred and must be paid, tr (h′, h). The recursive form of the
decision problem is stated as follows:
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Vj (e, a, h, d) = max
c,h′,a′
{
u
(
c, h′
)
+ ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, h′, d′
)}
s.t.
c+ a′ + tr
(
h′, h
)
+ h′ + δo · h′ = ye,j + (1 + r) · a+ h− d+ d′,
d′ 6 (1− φ1) · h′.
Renters who are becoming homeowners Suppose that the household
is a renter at the beginning of the period and chooses to be a homeowner during
this period. The housing stock at the beginning of this period is zero and positive
at the end of this period, that is h = 0 and h′ > 0. The household needs to decide
on the housing size. He has to pay for the new house. He could choose to borrow
against home equity, and he decides on the new debt level, d′. A transaction cost
incurred has to be paid, tr (h′, 0). The recursive form of the decision problem is
stated as follows:
Vj (e, a, 0, 0) = max
c,h′,a′
{
u
(
c, h′
)
+ ψj+1 · β · Ee,e′Vj+1
(
e′, a′, h′, d′
)}
s.t.
c+ a′ + tr
(
h′, 0
)
+ h′ + δo · h′ = ye,j + (1 + r) · a+ d′,
d′ 6 (1− φ1) · h′.
2.4.7 Stationary Equilibrium
We focus on an open-economy stationary equilibrium in which the interest rate,
r, is determined exogenously by the international market.17 The representative
firm chooses the optimal factor inputs in production then determines the wage
rate per efficiency unit, w. An exogenous interest rate is particular important and
attractive for this model: we want to single out the net effect of contract regimes,
and it is extremely important to fix the interest rate in both economies. The
interest rate affects mortgage debt payment, asset return, as well as household’s
17A similar approach has been used by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010), Kaplan
(2007) and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008).
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inter-temporal choice. In a close economy equilibrium, however, the interest rate
is endogenously higher in the refinancing regime, since households accumulate less
precautionary savings, which boosts the interest rate. Moreover, one important
feature of the U.S. economy is that domestic investment is financed by resources
from abroad. Therefore it is more suitable to adopt the open-economy equilibrium.
The state of an individual is fully characterized by a vector of state variables,
including idiosyncratic labor productivity, liquid asset holdings, housing stock,
mortgage status or debt information and household age. For notational efficiency,
we denote the state vector x = {e, a, h, s, j} and the state space X = {E × [0, a]×
[h, h] × S × J}, where a and h are the upper bounds for financial assets and
housing stock in this economy.18 And the distribution of the households over the
state space X is Ω.
1. The representative firm in the goods sector takes interest rate, r, as given,
and chooses an optimal factor inputs ratio of KL :
r = α ·
(
K
L
)α−1
− δk.
And the wage rate, w, is implied:
w = (1− α) ·
(
K
L
)α
.
2. The domestic labor markets clear: given wage rate w, a firm’s labor demand
equals the aggregation of individual labor supply, L =
∫
Xe · v · l dΩ.
3. Given factor prices, interest rate r and wage w, the value function and
decision rules are solved for the household optimization problem, namely,
V (x), a′(x), h′(x), f(x),s′(x) and c(x).
4. The government runs balanced budget, T = P , where T = τ · w · L is the
total labor income tax from working cohorts, and P = p ·
J∑
j=j∗
µj is the total
pension payment to retired cohorts. The implied tax rate is τ = Pw·L .
5. Financial market clears, Ad =
∫
Xa
′(x) dΩ.
6. Renting market clears, F =
∫
Xf(x) dΩ.
7. Housing market clears, H =
∫
Xh
′(x) dΩ.
8. Financial intermediary firm maximizes profit and earns zero profit.
18The variables a and h are so large that households do not accumulate financial assets
and housing stock more than a and h, given the exogenous income process.
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9. Domestic goods market clears, namely,
C + δo ·H + δk ·K + δr · F + Υ +NX = KαL1−α.
where C, H, K, F , Υ and NX are the aggregate nonhousing consumption,
aggregate housing stock, aggregate physical capital, residential housing, ag-
gregate transaction cost and current account in this economy.
10. World asset market clears, which requires the change in net foreign asset
position equals the current account, namely,
r · (D +K + F −Ad) = NX.
where D is domestic aggregate mortgage debt.
11. The distribution, Ω, over the whole state space, i.e., age, financial assets,
housing stock, earning shocks, and mortgage status (or debt) is invariant.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we evaluate how financial liberalization affects aggregate trends,
such as the saving rate/consumption share, debt holding and the homeownership
rate. We use the model with traditional mortgage loans as a benchmark, which
approximates the pre-deregulation economy in early 1980. To analyze the impact
of financial liberalization, we conduct the following experiment:
Experiment 1: Compute the model with traditional mortgage loans with
a high downpayment ratio.
Experiment 2: Compute the model with refinancing opportunities with a
high downpayment ratio.
Experiment 3: Compute the model with refinancing opportunities with a
low downpayment ratio.
Experiment 4: Compute the model with traditional mortgage loans with
a low downpayment ratio.
The differences between Experiments 1 and 3 gives the full impact of financial
deregulation. To analyze the impact of refinancing opportunities, we compare re-
sults from Experiments 1 and 2. To analyze the role that low downpayment ratio
plays during financial liberalization, we compare results between Experiments 2
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and 3. We also conduct a counter factual Experiment 4, where a lower down-
payment ratio is allowed but refinancing opportunities are not available. The
comparison between Experiments 1 and 4, allows us to identify how the lowering
downpayment ratio alone could affect the aggregate trends.
It is important to note that, one of our contributions is that results from our
experiments can separate the effects of lowering downpayment requirements from
the effects of refinancing. In reality, both increasing availability of refinancing and
decreasing downpayment requirements happened at the same time during financial
liberalization. Previous studies usually regard lower downpayment requirements
as an increase in access to housing equity, and use this change alone to approxi-
mate the impact of financial liberalization. However, as we highlight in previous
text, given the standard payment schedule (or the first mortgage regime in this
paper), low downpayment requirements do not necessarily imply more access to
home equity at all. As acknowledged by Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2009), previous
literature cannot “disentangle one from the other”(page 21).
2.5.1 Calibration Strategy
We choose to calibrate the economy with traditional mortgage loans to match
important features of the pre-deregulation U.S. economy in the early 1980s. Cali-
bration of the benchmark economy is the in the following order: demographics and
timing, preferences, the earnings process, the technology, and housing and renting
markets. The parameters are summarized in Table 2.3.
Demographics and Timing To ease the computational burdens, one
model period is five years.19 Households are born at age 20, and die at the max-
imum age of 80. The retirement age is 60. Survival probabilities are taken from
United Nations (2002), which provides the survival probability for the year of 2000.
Preferences We use the following standard Constant Relative Risk Aver-
sion (CRRA) utility function. The Cobb-Douglas aggregator between housing
consumption and non-durable consumption is used.
u(c, hs) = (cγ · hs1−γ)1−σ/(1− σ)
Housing services provided by owner-occupied housing are assumed to be same
as the housing stock owned by the owners. The coefficient of risk aversion, σ, is
set to 2, which is commonly used in the literature. The weight households put on
nonhousing consumption, γ, is calibrated to match the ratio of housing services to
19We translate all the parameters at annual frequency into the ones for a model period
of five years. All the parameters reported are annual data.
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nonhousing consumption, which was 0.23 in the early 1980s.20 The annual discount
factor, β = 0.9575, is calibrated to match the nonhousing wealth to income ratio,
2.5, (See Kaplan and Violante 2009).
Earnings Process There are a number of estimations of risky earning
process in the literature. We choose to follow Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2009).21
They estimate that the persistence and variance are ρ = 0.9895 and σe = 0.0158,
respectively.22 We approximate the AR(1) process by a 5-point Markov chain,
using the procedures described in Tauchen (1986).
The mean efficiency index over a life cycle is taken from Hansen (1993) so
that the model could replicate the cross-section age distribution of earnings of the
U.S. economy. Notice that the age-specific productivity profile is hump-shaped and
peaks at age 50. The household’s inelastic labor supply is chosen to be l = 0.3. The
replacement ratio is the ratio of retirement pension income to last year’s working
cohorts’ labor income. It is taken from Chambers et al. (2009a) and set at 0.3.
The labor income tax rate is solved endogenously, consistent with the assumption
of a balanced government budget.
Technology Similar to Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010), we fix the
interest rate at 3% in both of the economies by choosing a capital level K. The
wage rate for efficient labor unit is implied. The depreciation rate of capital, δk, is
set at 0.08. The share of physical capital in output is α = 0.30, which is standard
in the literature.
Housing and Renting Markets We set the selling cost equal at 7 per-
cent and buying cost at 2 percent of the housing values. They are consistent with
Martin and Gruber (2004), who document buying and selling cost with CEX data.
The downpayment ratio is set at 0.20 for the early 1980s case, which is close to the
average downpayment reported by the Federal Housing Finance Board and similar
to Campbell and Hercowitz (2009)’s estimation as well, see Table 2.1.
We calibrate renting depreciation rate, δr, the owning depreciation rate, δo, and
the minimum housing size, h
¯
, to jointly match the economy-wide homeownership
rate, which was 64% in early 1980s, housing to physical capital stock ratio, 0.60,
and the housing investment-stock ratio, 0.043.
20Housing services are defined as the value of housing consumption, that is, the sum of
renting and owning housing stock evaluated by the renting price.
21Alternatively, we can choose to follow Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), where
earning is defined as wage earnings plus transfer. They also allow for transitory shocks
and fixed effects. Therefore, their estimations of persistence and variance are ρ = 0.9989
and σe = 0.0166. Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2009)’s estimation is closer to our purpose.
However, it is important to know that the difference in various estimations is small and
they give very similar results.
22They find that this process can deliver a reasonable Gini index for earnings of regular
households (as in the SCF-98), and a coefficient of variation (CV), which is very similar to
the one in the SCF-98 for households outside the top 1 percent of the earnings distribution.
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Post-Deregulation U.S. Economy The post-deregulation U.S. econ-
omy is characterized by the model with refinancing opportunities and lower down-
payment ratios. We use exactly the same set of parameters for this economy, ex-
cept that households in this economy can access refinancing opportunities and the
downpayment requirement is lower. Table 2.1 shows that the average equity-value
ratio for newly purchased homes in 1983 was 22.6%, and this ratio has decreased
to 16.4% by 2001, Campbell and Hercowitz (2009). We thus experiment with a
downpayment ratio of 15% for the post-deregulated economy.
Table 2.3: Baseline Parameters: Pre-Deregulation
Parameter Economic interpretation Value
Demographics
J Maximum age 11
ψ Mortality risk United Nations (2002)
Preferences
σ CRRA risk aversion 2.00
β Annual discount rate 0.9575
γ Nonhousing consumption weight 0.85
Technology
η Capital share 0.30
δk Capital depreciation rate 0.08
Earning process
ρ Persistence 0.989
σe Standard deviation 0.0158
vj Efficiency index Hansen(2003)
Housing market
φ1 Downpayment ratio 0.20
τb Percentage cost of buying 0.02
τs Percentage cost of selling 0.07
δr Renting depreciation rate 0.14
δo Owning depreciation rate 0.043
h
¯
Minimum housing size 0.40
Source: Standard and Calibrated Parameters
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2.5.2 Quantitative Results
Homeownership Rate and Debt Holding
Table 2.4: Aggregate Trends in the Model
Downpayment Regime Ownership Debt Ratio Cons Share
High NR 64% 26% 92.6%
High R 70% 47% 93.8%
Low R 75% 56% 94.9%
Source: Numerical Experiments.
The homeownership rate is the percentage of homeowners in this economy. The
homeownership rate is substantially higher in the case where refinancing is allowed.
It goes up from 64% to 70%, given that we keep the downpayment ratio as high
as 20%. Lowering the downpayment ratio further helps to increase the homeown-
ership rate by 5 percentage points. Compared to data where the homeownership
rate increases from 64% to 69%, the model over predicts the change.23
Without refinancing opportunities, homeowners who experience negative in-
come shocks cannot make use of home equity they accumulate, unless they choose
to sell or downgrade their housing stocks. Refinancing options allow homeowners
to access their home equity without selling or downgrading their home. Therefore,
there are two channels by which the homeownership rate can increase. Firstly, re-
financing opportunities create fewer renters, given the same magnitude of negative
income shocks. Secondly, anticipating that home equity can be easily accessed,
households have more incentive to build up housing stock and start accumulating
housing stock earlier. Compared with the previous literature which argues that
demographic changes are important for the increase in homeownership rate (see
Chambers et al. 2009a), we stress financial liberalization also plays an important
role.
It should be noted that our model shows that allowing homeowners to access
equity can induce more households to purchase homes. This effect plays a major
role during financial liberalization. Lowering downpayment does help increase the
homeownership rate but turns out to be relatively less important.
We observe that the debt to labor income ratio increases in the refinancing
model, compared with the traditional mortgage model. The net mortgage debt to
labor income ratio is only 26%, in the case of the traditional mortgage. And it
23Our model over-predicts changes in homeownership rate. It is largely due to the
fact that our experiments assume an uniformed downpayment ratio and equal access to
refinancing opportunities. In reality, some households may not be eligible for refinancing,
and effective downpayment ratios also vary across groups with different eligibility.
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increases to 47%, when we allow homeowners access to refinancing opportunities.
Decreases in downpayment ratios drives this ratio further to 56%. In total, the two
mechanisms combined can deliver an increase of 30 percentage points, roughly in
line with the increase of 37 percentage points in the data. While we under-predict
the absolute level of net mortgage debt, we successfully deliver the substantial
change in debt levels.24 We also observe that the new borrowers increased by 8
percentage points, from 18% in the pre-deregulation economy, up to 26% in the
post-deregulation economy. It is also consistent with the increase of 7 percentage
points in the data.
These results are intuitive. Firstly, they go hand in hand with the fact that the
homeownership rate is higher. More households are willing to become homeowners
and purchase homes. They borrow from the financial intermediary, using housing
stock as a collateral. This results in a higher level of debt, given a certain labor
income. Secondly, refinancing opportunities allow homeowners to raise more debt,
when adverse income shocks occur. In the traditional mortgage environment,
homeowners with very low liquid assets, they have to sell or downgrade their
housing stock to insure themselves against adverse income shocks. In the case of
refinancing, the homeowners can borrow against their home equity to smooth out
consumption. Thirdly, lowered downpayment requirements allow homeowners to
make use of an even larger share of the home equity, and the first two mechanisms
are amplified. Comparing the two channels of financial liberalization, we also find
those opportunities which allows homeowners to access home equity has a stronger
effect than lowered downpayment requirement does.
Scoccianti (2009) also finds that a lower downpayment ratio does not gener-
ate substantial increase in net debt. He concludes that earning shocks must be
more permanent over time so that more households are borrowing constrained
and higher debt levels arise. However, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)
find that the transitory component of earning risk in the labor income process has
increased, and the permanent component has actually decreased. It seems difficult
to reconcile Scoccianti (2009)’s conclusion to what the data suggest. We use a very
standard, stochastic labor income processes for both the pre and post-deregulation
economy. The experiments show that the net mortgage debt can increase substan-
tially even without any increase in the persistence of income shocks. We stress that
refinancing opportunity plays a key role in the rising indebtedness during financial
liberalization.
24As it is well-known in the literature, the parameters used in our calibration of the
earnings process are not capable of generating enough wealth inequality, compared to
the data (see, for example, Castaneda et al. 2003). Clearly, this also implies too little
debt in the aggregate, since the wealth-poor are too rich with respect to the data. Our
calibration strategy is standard in the literature, which facilitates a comparison to the
previous literature. We leave it to future work to re-calibrate the earnings process to
match wealth inequality and debt holdings exactly.
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The Consumption Boom and The Decline of Saving Rate
As subsection 2.2.5 showed, it is useful to use the consumption share of personal
income to measure the trend of household saving rate.25 We observe that the
aggregate consumption share (the ratio of aggregate consumption to disposable
income) does increase by 2.3 percentage points, from 92.6% to 94.9%. We find that
allowing for refinancing options accounts for roughly half of the increase generated
by the model, while the lower downpayment ratios accounts for the other half. It
demonstrates that financial liberalization is responsible for roughly one-third of
the consumption boom in the U.S. economy.
We find that precautionary savings is substantially lower in the post-deregulation
economy. With refinancing, housing capital becomes a close substitute for the liq-
uid assets (or financial saving), although still inferior, in terms of insurance against
earning shocks. Because the housing stock becomes relatively more “liquid” and
consuming owner-occupied housing is cheaper than renting, households choose to
hold relatively more housing stock than households in the pre-deregulation econ-
omy. Meanwhile, they save less liquid financial assets out of precautionary motives.
Less precautionary savings release more resources for consumption purposes.
Since owner-occupied housing also provides housing consumption services, house-
holds consume more housing services as well.
Feldstein (2008) points out that financial innovations and refinancing in the
housing market help homeowners access home equity; therefore, they borrow more
and save less. Our model shows that financial liberalization helps households build
up more housing stock and save less in financial assets. In other words, they “save”
more in housing assets and they consume more housing services.
Mendoza et al. (2007) argues that financial development in the U.S. economy
helps to reduce precautionary saving. Therefore, part of the investment is financed
by foreign capital inflow. In our model, we also observe both of them. We lend
support to Mendoza et al. (2007) by showing that financial liberalization in the
housing market is an important aspect of the financial development.
Downpayment Requirements: High vs. Low
In this subsection, we identify the impact that lowering downpayment requirements
alone could have, on the aggregate trends. We thus conduct a counter-factual ex-
periment, where the downpayment requirement is lower but refinancing is still not
25The aggregate consumption is defined by the sum of the nonhousing consumption and
imputed housing consumption. Housing consumption is composed of renting service and
housing service generated by owner-occupied housing. Following the “user cost ”approach,
it is evaluated by “owning price”, namely the depreciation rate of owner-occupied housing
plus interest rate. According to the NIPA definitions, however, the imputed value of
owner-occupied housing is computed by using the “rental price”. In our case, this is
higher than the user-cost approach. This implies that the increase in consumption would
be even larger if we followed the NIPA definition. Personal income is defined by the sum
of domestic households’ labor income and return to financial assets.
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allowed. Interestingly, it turns out that the homeownership rate and debt holding
do not increase. Similarly, consumption share does not increase either. These
results are less surprising, because homeowners in this model are still required to
build up home equity over time, despite the lowered downpayment requirements.
They still cannot make use of the home equity they have accumulated in the past.
However, as we documented before, we observe an increase in the homeowner-
ship rate, debt holding and consumption share, when we decrease downpayment
requirements in the model with refinancing. These results are also intuitive. Since
homeowners in this model could make use of an even larger share of home equity,
the effects of removing forced-home-equity-saving (or accessing to home equity)
on the aggregate trends are amplified.
In summary, these results show that: 1) financial instruments, which allow
homeowners to have better access to home equity are critical part of financially
liberalization. And without refinancing opportunities, lowering downpayment ra-
tios only affects the trends marginally at the best; 2) However, the lowered down-
payment ratio amplifies the effect induced by the availability of refinancing oppor-
tunities.
The lessons learned from these experiments have strong policy implications:
policies which encourage low downpayment ratios alone are not responsible for the
substantial change in the aggregate trends, while policies that promote refinancing
opportunity are critical.
Risk-Sharing
Our analytical model shows that allowing for refinancing options lowers precau-
tionary saving and leads to more risk-sharing. Our results from the previous
sections showed that the drop in precautionary saving is indeed substantial. We
now analyze the impact of financial deregulation on risk-sharing. We measure risk-
sharing as the variance of the individual (nonhousing) consumption share Ci/C¯,
where C¯ is the average consumption. In an environment with perfect risk-sharing,
their consumption across time and income states, the variance is zero or Ci = C¯.
We compute this measure for the whole population in both economies. Since the
refinancing channel directly helps the working population who face labor income
risks to smooth out consumption, we also compute the risk-sharing for the working
population. The main results are summarized in the Table 2.5.
We find that for the whole population, the variance of individual consump-
tion relative to the average consumption decreases from 0.617 in the traditional
mortgage economy to 0.610 in the refinancing economy. If we lower the down-
payment ratio, it drops further to 0.608. The total difference in the risk-sharing
measures between the pre- and post-deregulated economies is 0.009. And the dif-
ference between working populations in these two types of economies is relatively
larger, 0.015. In the traditional mortgage economy, the variance is 0.608. And in
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Table 2.5: Risk-Sharing
Downpayment Regime Whole Pop Working Pop
High NR 0.617 0.608
High R 0.610 0.594
Low R 0.608 0.593
Source: Numerical Experiments.
the refinancing case, it drops to 0.594, and the lower downpayment ratio reduces
the variance further to 0.593. This larger difference is expected, since refinancing
helps the working population to insure against labor income risks, while the retired
population in both types of economies do not face income risks.
It should be noted that the variance we compute is a measure of the overall risk-
sharing effect of different insurance channels. Since, in the traditional mortgage
case, the insurance channels are limited to self-insurance (for the whole population)
and downgrading housing size (for the homeowners). In the refinancing case, the
additional risk-sharing channel (using home equity) would allow households to rely
less on the self-insurance. One evidence is that the aggregate precautionary savings
in the refinancing case is substantially lower than the non-refinancing case. In
other words, they substitute the home-equity risk-sharing channel for the standard
precautionary-saving, self-insurance channel. Our results show that refinancing
opportunities make households better off in terms of risk-sharing, despite the fact
that they make less use of the self-insure mechanism. In other words, the difference
in the risk-sharing measures of the two regimes under-predicts the effect of risk-
sharing provided by the refinancing channel.
Our results contribute to the literature that measures risk-sharing opportuni-
ties in incomplete market models. In an important contribution, Krueger and Perri
(2006) argue that allowing for more debt (through relaxing borrowing constraints)
in an Aiyagari-type incomplete markets model results in less risk-sharing because
debt is state-contingent. We show that this result does not hold in a life-cycle
economy when the increase in debt is generated by relaxing payment requirements
of mortgage loans.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluated the impact of deregulation of housing finance with a
quantitative life-cycle model. Overall, our model can deliver a substantial increase
in net mortgage debt, one third of the increase of total consumption share. The
increase in homeownership rate is also consistent with the aggregate trend. More-
over, we can separate the effect of the two aspects of financial liberalization. We
also show refinancing opportunities play a key role in financial liberalization.
79
CH. 2: MORTGAGE LOANS, SAVING RATE
There are several important aspects of the housing market which have been
left out in this research. First of all, we assume that refinancing is costless. And
we can consider that the exercise provides an upper bound for the effect of re-
financing. This assumption also implies that different forms of refinancing have
an equivalent impact on the aggregate economy. In reality, refinancing activities
differ substantially in many respects, for example cost, timing and eligibility etc.
Introducing different types of refinancing could help quantify the significance of
each type of refinancing. Moreover, housing prices may have a substantial impact
in risk-sharing and the household saving rate. Housing prices appreciation would
induce even more nonhousing consumption and further reduce the saving rate,
through the wealth effect. We acknowledge that they are important issues and
leave them to future work.
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Chapter 3
Why is the Correlation
Between Savings and
Investment So Low in
Developing Countries?
Chapter Summary
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) argue that the high correlation between savings and
investment observed in OECD countries implies that the capital is strongly immo-
bile internationally. This paper revisits one related stylized fact: The correlation
in question is actually lower for developing countries than for developed coun-
tries. Existing theories with “frictional market approach” seem to be at odds
with this empirical pattern: If the developing countries are less integrated into the
international markets, it would imply a higher correlation between savings and
investment. This paper proposes an explanation based on the permanent income
theory. A small open economy, which is hit by a transitory positive productivity
shock, increases both savings and investment, so that they are positively corre-
lated. Permanent shocks lead to the opposite scenario: savings and investment
respond in different directions, which results in a negative correlation. As shown
empirically by Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), permanent shocks dominate in the
lower income emerging economies, while transitory shocks around stable trends
dominate in industrial economies. Therefore, the correlation should be relatively
lower in developing countries than in developed countries.
Key words: Capital Mobility, Trend Shocks, Developing Countries
JEL classification: E3, F3
INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
3.1 Introduction
This paper revisits an interesting stylized fact that the correlation between savings
and investment in developing countries is generally lower than that in developed
countries. I show that one reason underlying this empirical pattern is that proper-
ties of productivity shock process in developing countries are different from their
developed counterparts. The purpose of this paper is then to provide a quantitative
assessment of this explanation.
The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle has been one of the most important issues in the
field of international macroeconomics. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) argue that
the correlation between savings and investment should be quite low, suppose that
the international financial market is close to perfect or the capital mobility is high.
However, their empirical results show that even for the developed OECD countries,
domestic savings and investment move quite closely to each other. They regress
domestic investment rates on domestic savings rates with data from 16 OECD
countries, i.e., the regression is specified as(
I
Y
)
i
= α0 + α1
(
S
Y
)
i
+ i
in which
(
I
Y
)
i
and
(
S
Y
)
i
are average investment rate and savings rate for a
country i in a given period. And  is the error term. α0 is the constant term, while
α1 is the coefficient in concern and often referred as “FH coefficient”.
They find a positive and substantial FH coefficient, which is close to one.
This evidence has been used to support the argument that international financial
market is not perfect but frictional. Feldstein-Horioka puzzle stimulated a large
amount literature which both empirically re-exam and theoretically explain this
high correlation (see Coakley et al. (1998) and Tesar (1991) for review of this
issue). Among others, Bai and Zhang (2009) is one of the most recent research,
which aims at explaining this empirical pattern by financial frictions.1
However, another aspect of this regression analysis has not attracted as much
attention as the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. As shown in various studies, both cross-
section wise and time series wise, not only the savings-investment correlations are
high in general, but also they are even higher for industrial countries than for the
developing countries.
For example, Frankel et al. (1988) is one of the cross-section studies, which
exams the savings and investment behaviors in these two groups of countries in the
period of 1960-84. And they document that the correlation is substantially weaker
for developing countries than for developed countries. This finding is the same
as in Summers (1989). Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) also run the same regressions
with a different dataset in a shorter time horizon. They find quite similar results:
Country groups with higher income level tend to have higher FH coefficient.
1They confirm the puzzle by running the same regressions with a longer period and
updated data (1960-2000).
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Table 3.1: Related Evidence
Sample 1990-1997
Full Sample 0.41
(0.008)
Countries with GNP/Cap > 1000 0.48
(0.09)
Countries with GNP/Cap > 2000 0.70
(0.09)
OECD Countries 0.60
(0.09)
Source: Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001)
I use updated World development Indicators (WDI) data from 1960 to 2000
and run the same regressions with the whole sample, as well as with the sub-
samples of advanced OECD and developing countries respectively. 2 I also run
regressions for each sub-period with the whole sample and the two subs-samples.
The full sample results are just similar to Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Bai and
Zhang (2009): the FH coefficient is indeed positive and significant.3 Comparison
between the advanced OECD and developing countries gives interesting results.
The FH coefficient for developed countries is always higher than that for developing
countries in any sub-periods. For the whole period, 1960-2005, the gap is 0.22. For
the sub-periods of 1960-74 and 1974-2000, the gap is 0.41 and 0.10, respectively.
Table 3.2: Savings-Investment Correlations
Sample 1960-2000 1960-1974 1974-2000
Developing Countries 0.43 0.28 0.46
Advanced OECD 0.69 0.69 0.56
Full Sample 0.46 0.46 0.45
Feldstein-Horioka n.a. .89 n.a.
Source: WDI and Feldstein and Horioka (1980)
Following the “time-series approach” first proposed by Obstfeld (1989), Mamingi
(1997) estimates savings and investment correlations for 58 developing countries,
2The choice of sample countries follows Bai and Zhang (2009). The advanced OECD
countries are the same as Feldstein and Horioka(1980). The rest of the sample is labeled
as developing countries.
3The difference in the empirical results between Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Bai
and Zhang (2009) comes from data sources they use as well as the changes in systems of
national accounts (SNA) (See Bai and Zhang 2009 for details).
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using annual time-series data for the period from 1970 to 1990. He evaluates the
degree of capital mobility in the Feldstein-Horioka sense for these countries. And
his finding suggests that for the majority of developing countries, the correlations
between savings and investment are indeed lower than those for developed coun-
tries.
This paper shows that the savings-investment correlation is affected by the
relative importance of the permanent (or transitory) component in the produc-
tivity shock process. The developing countries experience distinct productivity
shock processes from their developed counterparts, and therefore, their savings
and investment behaviors are different as well.
Suppose there are two types of productivity shocks in a small open economy.
Firstly, consider the scenario that the small open economy is hit by a transitory
positive technological innovation (“cycle shock”). This results in an immediate
increase in income. However, since the shock is transitory, it has little effect
on the household’s permanent income. Therefore, consumption responds to the
shock by less than the increase in income, so that domestic savings rises. At the
same time, the positive productivity shock shifts up the marginal productivity
of capital. A standard no-arbitrage argument implies that the economy shifts
resources to capital formation. Resources are directed in capital and investment
booms. Therefore, it results in a positive correlation between investment and
savings.
Secondly, consider a shock to the growth trend (“trend shock”). Current pos-
itive shock implies higher income today and even higher income in the future.
Consumption responds more than income and savings have to decrease to smooth
consumption. Similar to the previous case, the positive shock to productivity raises
investment. And therefore, the correlation between savings and investment will be
negative before the economy adjusts back to the steady state.
Thirdly, empirically, one of the remarkable and fundamental features of lower
income economies is that non-stationary shocks (or shocks to trend growth) are the
primary sources of their fluctuations. In contrast, stationary shocks (or transitory
fluctuations around a stable trend) are driving the business cycles for industrial
economies (Aguiar and Gopinath 2007).4 If a developing economy is hit by a pro-
ductivity shock, it is more likely to be a trend shock, then savings and investment
will be less positively correlated. In contrast, if a developed economy is hit by
a productivity shock, it is more likely to be transitory, then savings and invest-
ment will be more positively correlated. Therefore, the lower savings-investment
correlation in developing countries emerges as the consequence of their different
underlying shock properties from developed countries.
This empirical pattern has long been neglected, when efforts are made to ex-
plain the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Previous research on Feldstein-Horioka puz-
zle could be grouped as “frictional market approach”and “frictionless market ap-
proach”. The first line of research follows Feldstein-Horioka’s hypothesis that
4They identify the information on the persistence of productivity process with con-
sumption and net exports behaviors.
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financial frictions are important. For example, Bai and Zhang (2009) include en-
forcement constraint into an one-bond small open economy. They find endogenous
borrowing constraint is more stringent for poor countries with low capital stock
and poor countries can borrow much less than developed countries. Endogenous
borrowing constraint limits the capital flow from rich countries to poor countries,
when poor countries receive positive productivity shocks. This effect is driving
the high correlation between savings and investment in the world. However, in
their model, poorer economies are more closed and co-movement between savings
and investment is stronger. Their mechanism seems to be at odds with the lower
correlations in developing countries.
Other frictions have also been proposed to solve the puzzle. Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2001) show that costs in international goods market trade drive a wedge
between the effective domestic real interest rate and the world real interest rate.
This wedge or “kink” in the inter-temporal budget constraint can induce the home
country to behave in a fairly autarkic manner. However, the trade costs are bigger,
at least no smaller in developing countries than developed countries. Generally,
if we follow Feldstein-Horioka’s conjecture, i.e., financial frictions (or other type
frictions) are to be blamed for the high correlation, it implies that the correlation
is larger for developing countries than for developed countries.
Another line of research tries to understand the high correlation between sav-
ings and investment with perfect mobility of capital cross countries. Those mod-
els rely on persistent exogenous shocks to generate positive correlations between
savings and investment. Both Finn (1990) and Mendoza (1991) argue that the
correlation between savings and investment in a small open economy can be quite
high, even if the capital market is perfect mobile. Any kind of savings-investment
correlation can be created, depending on the underlying stochastic process. There-
fore, theoretically, positive correlations between savings and investment should not
be interpreted as a low degree of capital mobility. Similarly, this paper also shows
that the key determinant is the persistence of productivity shocks. However, this
paper focus on the difference between developing and developed countries, instead
of industrial countries alone. I calibrate the model such that it can match a number
of moments of the average statistics in developing and developed countries. There-
fore, I can quantitatively evaluate how the relative importance of the permanent
(transitory) component affects the correlation between savings and investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I will set up
a model based on Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), i.e., a simple small open economy
with both transitory and permanent productivity shocks. The model is solved
with Uhlig’s numerical package (Uhlig 1995). Section 3.3 presents the quantitative
analysis. Both impulse response and numerical analyses are included. And the
section 3.4 concludes. The Appendix C.1 shows the details of analytical solution,
while Appendix C.2 and C.3 provides the computational details.
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3.2 The Model
This section lays out a simple small open-economy model, by closely following
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). Compared with the standard small open-economy
RBC model with persistent shocks, the only deviation is to incorporate non-
stationary shocks to productivity innovation process.
3.2.1 Environment
Household The economy is populated by a one unit mass of households
with standard Cobb-Douglas utility. The representative household enjoys both
consumption and leisure. The period utility at period t reads,
ut =
(
Cγt (1− Lt)1−γ
)1−σ
1− σ ,
where γ is the relative weight the household puts on consumption, while σ
measures the risk aversion. Lt is the labor supply and therefore Nt = 1 − Lt is
the leisure consumed at period t. The representative household supplies labor and
rents physical capital he owns, Kt, to firms in the goods sector, given the prevailing
factor prices, wage rate, i.e., wt and interest rate, rt.
The representative household can borrow and lend in the international financial
market. There is only one risk-free and one-period bond available for households
to trade. The debt level at period t is Bt. Following both Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), it is assumed that the interest rate
is increasing in the aggregate level of foreign debt.5 Precisely, the risk premium
increases in the amount of foreign debt. The interest is the sum of international
interest rate r∗ and the risk premium. Specifically,
rt = r
∗ + ψ ·
[
e
Bt+1−B∗
Γt − 1
]
, (3.1)
where B∗ is the steady state level of debt holding and ψ measures the sensitivity of
interest rate to the changes in debt levels. This specification implies that rt = r
∗
at the steady state.
Therefore, the representative household makes his decisions, subject to the
following resource constraint,
5As Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) points out, it is a well-known issue that the
dynamics of standard small open economy is not well behaved, since it critically depends
on the initial condition, i.e., net foreign assets position. To maintain the stationarity,
additional assumptions have to be imposed. One of the popular approaches is to assume
that the interest rate faced by domestic households is increasing in the level of outstanding
debt.
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Ct + It + Φ(Kt,Kt+1) ·Kt = Yt + (qt ·Bt+1 −Bt)
where Φ(Kt,Kt+1) is an adjustment cost function, It the investment and qt =
1
1+rt
the price of bond at period t. At period t, the household receives total income of
Yt. And he also pays back the outstanding debt, Bt, and raises new debt, Bt+1.
Therefore, qt · Bt+1 − Bt represents the resources borrowed from international
market for the purpose of consumption and domestic capital formation.
The household consumes Ct and invests It to adjust his capital holding from
Kt to Kt+1. Let δ denote the depreciation rate of capital, and the stock of capital
evolves according to
Kt+1 = It − (1− δ) ·Kt
The adjustment is assumed to be costly.6 And the cost function is chosen to
be the following quadratic form,
Φ(Kt,Kt+1) =
φ
2
·
(
Kt+1
Kt
− eµg
)2
where φ captures the importance of the adjustment cost. Moreover, the constant
term in the adjustment cost function, eµg , guarantees that adjustment costs are
zero on the long-run non-stochastic growth path.7
The household’s problem is to maximize the life time utility, subject to the
period budget constraint.
Firm On the production side, there is a representative firm that produces
one-good by employing labor, Lt, and capital, Kt, from the household sector in
competitive factor markets. It also sells its output in a competitive goods market.
Production function is also standard Cobb-Douglas,
Yt = At ·K1−αt · Lαt , (3.2)
where α is the labor’s share of output in this economy and At is the productivity
at period t, which the firm takes as given.
Productivity process is characterized by At = e
zt · Γαt . The first component
aims to capture the standard productivity shock process (“cycle shocks”) , in which
zt follows a standard AR(1) process,
6In small open economy models, it is standard to include the adjustment costs, so that
it avoids excessive investment volatility in response to changes in the differential between
domestic and international interest rates.
7Additional restriction on the adjustment cost function has to be imposed to ensure
that the adjustment costs are zero in the non-stochastic steady state and the domestic
interest equals the marginal product of capital net of depreciation.
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zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt , (3.3)
where |ρz| < 1 and εzt is iid with zero mean and standard deviation of σz. The
second component, Γt, gives the stochastic trend in this model, which is assumed
to be the cumulative product of “growth shocks” in the past, gs, where s ≤ t,
Γt = e
gt · Γt−1 =
t
Π
s=0
egs ,
The growth shocks also follow an AR(1) process,
gt = (1− ρg) · µg + ρg · gt−1 + εgt , (3.4)
where εgt is an iid shock with zero mean and standard deviation of σg and
|ρg| < 1. Moreover, µg gives the long run mean growth rate of productivity.
Since the growth shocks are positively correlated and are cumulative over time,
the growth trend in this model is stochastic and non-stationary.8
The firm’s problem is relatively simple. It maximizes its profit at each period.
The profit function at period t is defined by pit,
pit = At ·K1−αt · Lαt − wt · Lt − (rt + δ) ·Kt,
3.2.2 Recursive Formulation
The problem can be de-trended with the trend productivity up to the current
period, Γ. The system is normalized with the following “change in variable” tech-
niques,
x′ =
X ′
Γ
,
where x′ represents the de-trended version of variable X ′. Formally, the de-trended
version of the household problem can be restated in the following recursive formu-
lation,
V (k, b, z, g) = max
c,l,k′,b′
(
cγ (1− l)1−γ
)1−σ
1− σ + β · e
g·γ·(1−σ)E
[
V
(
k′, b′, z′, g′
) |z, g]
8The key difference between this model and the standard RBC model in small open
economy setup is the additional non-stationary productivity shock. This assumption is
a critical to Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)’s hypothesis and empirical estimations. They
demonstrate that the observed economic activities at business cycle frequencies are driven
by the shocks to stochastic trend in lower income emerging economies. In contrast, de-
veloped economies have rather stable trends and business cycles are mostly driven by
transitory shocks.
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The value function of the representative agent is a function of capital of his
own, k, debt holding, b, and shock realizations of the two types, z and g.9 The
right-hand side of the Bellman equation consists of the utility derived from current
consumption and leisure, as well as the discounted expected continuation value,
which is conditional on both z and g.10
The representative household chooses consumption, leisure, capital and debt
holding optimally. The representative household’s choice is subject to the normal-
ized version of resource constraint,
c+ k′eg = y + (1− δ) k − φ
2
(
k′
k
eg − eµg
)2
k − b+ qb′eg (3.5)
Given the recursive formulation described above, the definition of a competitive
equilibrium is stated as follows.11
1. Value function V (·) and policy functions c (·), ls (·), k′s (·) and b′ (·) solve the
household’s maximization problem, taking factor prices given, namely, wage
rate, w, and interest rate, r.
2. The representative firm maximizes profit pi each period. And the factor
prices are competitively determined.
3. The asset market clears so that k′s (k, b, z, g) = kd.
4. The labor market clears so that ls (k, b, z, g) = ld.
5. The goods market clears, which implies that Equation (3.5) holds.12
The optimal choices of the representative household are characterized by the
following first order conditions,
[
cγ (1− l)(1−γ)
]−σ
γcγ−1 (1− l)(1−γ) = λ, (3.6)
c
(1− l) =
γ
(1− γ)yL, (3.7)
9It is also standard to assume that β · eµg·γ·(1−σ) · (1 + r∗) = eµg . This assumption is
the counterpart of the assumption β ·(1+r∗) = 1 in standard small open economy without
trend shocks (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2003, for example). Note that if the long run
growth rate µg = 0, this condition reduces to the standard case.
10Although labor supply does not need to be trended, I replace L by l to make the
notation consistent throughout the formulation.
11The subscript (s) on ks and ls indicates “supply ”from households. And the subscript
(d) on kd and ld indicates “demand ”.
12By Walras’s law, the fact that international asset market is cleared is implied.
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β̂ · Eλ′ = q · λ, (3.8)
β̂ · Eλ′ ·
yk′ + (1− δ) + φ
2
(k′′
k′
eg
)2
− (eµg)2
 = λ · [φ(k′
k
eg + eµg
)2
+ 1
]
,
(3.9)
where β̂ = β ·eg·γ·(1−σ)−g.13 Some remarks are in order. Equation (3.6) shows that
the co-state variable, λ, equals to the marginal utility of consumption. Equation
(3.7) is the intra-temporal condition which ensures that the household chooses
labor and consumption optimally. Equation (3.8) is the standard pricing formula
for the bond, except that the discount factor is adjusted by the trend. The right-
hand side of Equation (3.9) gives the marginal cost of increasing one unit of capital
in current period, while the left-hand side gives the discounted and expected benefit
of doing so. Note that if we assume that adjustment cost is irrelevant, φ = 0,
Equation (3.9) becomes the standard inter-temporal condition. Moreover, if we
assume µg = g = 0, the household’s problem reduces to the standard small open-
economy real business cycle model (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2003).
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
This section presents quantitative analysis of this model. In subsection 3.3.1, I first
describe the basic solution algorithm I use for solving this model. To facilitate the
exposition of intuitions in the model, I conduct the impulse response analysis in
subsection 3.3.2. I describe the calibration strategy and present the numerical
results from simulations in subsection 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, respectively.
3.3.1 Numerical Solution
The model does not admit any closed-form solutions and needs to be solved nu-
merically. The model is solved numerically by following the method proposed by
Uhlig (1995), which has been widely used to solve non-linear dynamic discrete time
stochastic models. In essence, it is an Euler-equation based approach and requires
a log-linear approximation of the system around the steady state. It also imposes
the linear form of recursive law of motion around the steady state, so that the
method of undetermined coefficient can be applied to solve the linearized equation
system. The following steps are taken to implement the algorithm for solution and
simulation.
13Please refer to the Appendix C.1 for detailed solution.
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Firstly, I defined the exogenous state vector, Z = [z, g]T , endogenous state
vector, S = [k, b]T , as well as the choice vector M = [y, c, n, l, nx, s]T , where y
represents output, n leisure, l labor, nx net export and s savings.14
Secondly, the equation system Υ that characterizes the problem, comprises of
the equilibrium relationships between state variables and choice variables, as well
as the laws of motion for state variables. Related equations are Equations (3.2),
(3.3),(3.4), (3.1), (3.5), (3.7),(3.9) and (3.8). Moreover we also need the following
identities, (3.10), (3.12) and (3.11), to complete the system,
n ≡ 1− l, (3.10)
s ≡ y − c, (3.11)
nx ≡ y −X − c. (3.12)
Equations (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12) describe the definitions of leisure, savings,
and net export, respectively. Moreover, X in Equation (3.12) denotes the gross
investment and X = k′eg − (1− δ) k + φ2
(
k′
k e
g − eµg
)2
k.
Thirdly, to obtain the steady state information, it is necessary to impose the
conditions that S′ = S, M ′ = M and Z = Z∗ = [0, µg] (see Appendix C.2 for
details).15 Moreover, the equation system Υ needs to be log-linearized around the
steady state, so that the system is approximately linear in the log-deviations from
the steady state (see Appendix C.3 for details).
Fourthly, to solve the linearized version of system Υ, the law of motion of S′
and M ′ need to be found. Usually, it is standard to postulate that the recursive law
of motion is linear, and specifically, it is characterized by the following equation,(
S′
M ′
)
= P ·
(
S
Z ′
)
(3.13)
where P is the coefficient matrix, which governs the dynamics of the system around
the steady state.
Fifthly, in theory, method of undetermined coefficients can be used to find the
coefficient matrix, P . In practice, this paper uses the “Uhlig package”(Uhlig 1995),
which implements the undetermined coefficients method numerically.
Sixthly, since the coefficient matrix, P , can fully characterize the dynamics of
the linearized system, impulse response analysis can be conducted without simu-
lating the model. Suppose that the system is initially at the steady state before
14Some of the choice variables are redundant but this formulation helps to make the
numerical analysis easier. XT represents the transpose of the vector X.
15The equation system Υ is highly non-linear and no much information can be extracted
from it, unless we switch to analyzing its dynamics around the steady state.
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the Period 0. And exogenous shocks deviate from Z∗ at the beginning of Period 0
and returns to Z∗ from Period 1 on. The law of motion, Equation (3.13), allows
one to trace out the trajectories of all the variables from Period 0, until the system
come backs to the steady state.
Finally, simulations are conducted by using Equation (3.13). It is first nec-
essary to draw a sequence of realizations of the exogenous shock vector from its
distribution matrix. Starting with the steady state information of the state vari-
ables, the dynamics of endogenous state variables can be recursively computed.
Similarly, choice variables can be also computed with information both on exoge-
nous and endogenous states in each period.
3.3.2 Impulse Response Analysis
Preceding the numerical analysis, this subsection aims at providing intuitions on
how investment and savings respond to trend and cycle shocks in this model. For
this purpose, I present an analysis of impulse responses to the two types of shocks.
Figure 3.1 shows the dynamics of investment and savings from an initial steady
state after a one-percent positive transitory shock, that is, z1 = 0.01. Figure 3.2
displays the impulse responses of these two variables, after a one-percent positive
growth shock, that is, g1 = 0.01.
Initially, before Period zero, the economy is at the steady state level in both
cases. Figure (3.1) and (3.2) shows that following one-percent of the two types
of shocks, investments in the two distinct cases have similar responses: increase
immediately from the steady state level, upon the point where the shocks realize,
and adjust back to steady state level gradually. In contrast, the dynamics of savings
is quite different in these two scenarios. On the one hand, following a transitory
shock, savings increase first and adjusts back to the steady state sluggishly. On the
other hand, savings decrease immediately when the shock realization is permanent
and returns to the steady state in the following years.
The intuitions behind these different dynamics are based on the permanent
income theory. Firstly, given a positive transitory shock to the productivity level,
output increases. Since the shock is transitory, the household expects that the
output will eventually decrease in the future. The households smooth the windfall
gain over his life time. At the period of shock, consumption increases by less than
the increase in output. Hence savings increase accordingly.
Secondly, consider a shock to the growth trend. The household observes that
the economy is experiencing a period of high growth. Current positive shock
implies higher output today and even higher output in the following periods. Con-
sumption will respond more than the increase in output. It implies that savings
have to decrease to smooth consumption.
Thirdly, the dynamics of investment in these two scenarios are pretty similar.
In both cases, positive shocks enhance the productivity in the small open economy
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Figure 3.1: Impulse Response to Cycle Shock
Note: The vertical axis gives the changes in percent deviation from the
steady state for both investment and savings, after one-percent transitory
shock.
and the marginal productivity of capital increases. Since the economy is small
and the international interest rate is determined by the international interest rate
and outstanding debt position. The initial real rate of return on bonds is rela-
tively lower. A standard no-arbitrage argument implies that the economy shifts
resources from bonds to capital formation, therefore investment increases upon the
unexpected shocks. The only difference between effects of the different types of
shock is that the investment boom lasts longer in the case of permanent shocks.
In summary, given a transitory shock, both savings and investment move in
the same direction. Or in other words, transitory shocks trigger a positive co-
movements between savings and investment, which results in a positive correlation
between these two variables. In contrast, savings and investment respond to the
permanent shock in different directions, which results in a negative correlation.
In this model, therefore, the relative importance of permanent shocks in pro-
ductivity innovation process matters for the correlation between savings and in-
vestment. If the permanent (transitory) shocks account for larger component the
shock process, the correlation will be relatively lower (higher). In the following
subsections, I evaluate quantitatively how the distinct shock processes in develop-
ing and developed countries can help to explain the different savings-investment
behaviors in these two types of economies.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Response to Trend Shock
Note: The vertical axis gives the changes in percent deviation from the
steady state for both investment and savings, after one-percent perma-
nent shock.
3.3.3 Calibration Strategy
In this subsection, I briefly describe the calibration strategy for the numerical ex-
periments. Throughout the experiments, I assume that the two types of economies
are otherwise identical, except the shock processes they experience. I further as-
sume that the persistences of cycle and trend shocks and the long run average
growth rate, ρz, ρg and µg, are shared by both developing and developed countries.
I calibrate ρg, so that the correlation of consumption, and output, in developed
economy can be close to the data. I also choose to set ρz = 0.95, which is pretty
standard for the stationary persistent shock.16 Therefore, the pair of trend and
cycle shocks variances distinguish lower income developing countries from the de-
veloped counterparts. I calibrate σz and σg for both developing and developed
countries, so that the model can match the standard deviation of output, σ(Y ),
and the autocorrelation of output, ρ(Y ), in both types of countries.
In the case of developing countries, both of the calibrated variances of perma-
nent and transitory shocks are higher than their developed counterparts. More-
16These empirical moments are taken from (Aguiar and Gopinath 2007). However, my
calibration strategy is different from their estimation process. They structurally estimate
shock processes for only Canada and Mexico. I instead choose to match a set of average
moments of developing and developed.
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Table 3.3: Calibration Targets
Type Moment Value
Developed countries σ(Y ) , standard deviation 1.34
Developing countries σ(Y ) , standard deviation 2.74
Developed countries ρ(Y ) , autocorrelation 0.75
Developing countries ρ(Y ) , autocorrelation 0.76
Developed countries ρ(C, Y ), correlation 0.66
Note: Average values of the selected moments for developing
developed countries. Y and C are the output and
consumption, respectively.
over, the ratio of the variance of permanent shocks to the variance of transitory
shocks is higher, which is consistent with the fact that non-stationary component
is relatively more important in developing countries.
The remaining parameters characterize the household’s preferences and the
firm’s technology in this model. They are parameterized by using standard data
in the RBC literature. The risk aversion parameter, σ, is chosen to be 2 and the
weight on consumption is γ = 0.36. The quarterly discount rate β is standard from
the literature, 0.98. The capital share, α, is set at 0.32, which is also common in
RBC models. I choose the quarterly depreciation rate, δ, to be 0.05. I fix the
adjustment cost parameter, ψ, at 2.5 for the benchmark case. Table 3.4 describes
the benchmark parameters used in the model and summarizes the values.
3.3.4 Results
In this subsection, I present numerical results from simulations. I calculate the
correlation between savings and investment by experimenting different sets of pa-
rameters and intend to investigate how the correlation between savings and invest-
ment responds to the relative importance of permanent (or transitory) component.
I also study how the adjustment costs are responsible for the correlation by ex-
perimenting different adjustment cost parameters. Main results are summarized
in Table 3.5 and 3.6.
I first experiment with the calibrated shock processes for developing and devel-
oped countries. I find that the correlation between savings and investment in the
experiment for developing countries is 0.17, substantially lower than its counter-
part in the case of developed countries, 0.37. It confirms the intuitions derived
from the impulse response analysis. The permanent shocks trigger the opposite
responses of savings and investment. And when they dominate in the productivity
shock process of developing countries, the savings and investment is relatively less
correlated than the developed economy case, where transitory shocks are relatively
more important.
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Table 3.4: Baseline Parameters
Parameter Economic interpretation Value
σ CRRA risk aversion 2.0
β Quarterly discount rate 0.98
η Capital share 0.32
δ Depreciation rate 0.05
ψ Adjustment cost 2.5
ρz Cycle shock persistence 0.95
ρg Trend shock persistence 0.40
σz Standard deviation of cycle shocks 1.25/0.68
σg Standard deviation of trend shocks 2.28/0.85
µg Long-run average growth rate 1.06
Source: Standard and calibrated parameters. Values before
(behind) slash are the averages for the developing (developed)
countries
Table 3.5: Benchmark Results
φ = 2.5 σz = 1.25 σz = 0.68
σg = 2.28 0.17 -0.06
σg = 0.85 0.60 0.37
Source: Simulation
To understand the role of each shock component, I also carry out two counter-
factual experiments. Firstly, in the developing countries case, I keep the variance
of permanent shocks unchanged and decrease the variance of transitory shocks
from 1.25 to 0.68, so that the transitory component plays an even less important
role in the productivity shock process. It is shown that the correlation decreases
substantially from 0.17 to −0.06. In other words, greater permanent component
can even drive the correlation to be even negative. Secondly, I keep the variance of
transitory shocks unchanged and decrease the variance of permanent shocks from
2.28 to 0.85. It is observed that the correlation in question increases from 0.17
to 0.60. It is also intuitive: Given the transitory shocks play greater role in this
productivity process, the correlation is more positively correlated.
In summary, recessions (or booms) in the two types of economies are different
objects. If recessions (or booms) hit industrial economies, they tend to be more
transitory and return to the relatively stable trend in shorter periods. If recessions
(or booms) hit lower income countries, they tend to be more permanent and last
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for longer periods. Therefore, households adjust their savings and investment
behaviors differently.
Table 3.6: Low Adjustment Cost
φ = 1.0 σz = 1.25 σz = 0.68
σg = 2.28 0.15 -0.08
σg = 0.85 0.50 0.30
Source: Simulation
In this model, it is straightforward to study how the adjustment costs affect
the correlation between savings and investment. The high adjustment costs limit
the flow of capital from and to the international markets. With low adjustment
costs, the correlation between savings and investment will be even lower: since it
is easier to adjust investment through the international market, the investment
decision will be less constrained by the domestic savings. Table 3.6 presents the
results from experiments where adjustment costs, ψ, is set at 1.0, a lower value than
the benchmark case. Comparing with table (3.5), all the correlations computed
from similar experiments are lower in Table 3.6.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper revisits one interesting stylized fact which has long been neglected in
the field of international finance: not only the savings-investment correlations are
high in general, but also they are even higher for industrial countries than for
the developing countries. This seems to be at odds with the Feldstein-Horioka’s
hypothesis that international market frictions are driving the positive and high
correlation between savings and investment. This paper proposes an explanation
based on Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)’s new empirical findings: in lower income
economies, permanent shocks are relatively more important in the productivity
shock process, while in industrial economies transitory shocks dominates. This
paper shows that the relative importance of permanent shocks matters for the
correlation between savings and investment. If the permanent (transitory) shocks
account for larger component the shock process, the correlation will be relatively
lower (higher).
This research shows that developing countries adjust their savings and invest-
ment behavior quite differently from the developed countries, when they can be
fully integrated into the international markets. One natural question should be
addressed in future research: what are the potential gains from the access to the
international markets for developing countries, given their underlying shock pro-
cess are quite different from the developed counterparts? Are these gains bigger or
smaller, comparing to the developed countries? And related to this question, what
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are the potential losses of being cut off from the international markets, given the
random walk component accounts for a large share of the Solow residual variation?
I leave these questions for the future research.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Analytical Results
A.1.1 Euler Equations
Euler equations are derived by following the procedure:
1. Use budget constraint to express consumption choice with state and other
choice variables and substitute it for consumption c in the Bellman equation.
2. Rearrange the expected continuation value. V
(
Kg(b), kg(b), A′
)
is the con-
tinuation value if the good (bad) shock is realized and the exogenous shock
turns out to beA′.
[
n · V (Kg, kg, A′) + (1− n)V (Kb, kb, A′)] is the expected
continuation value, given A. Since A′ is also stochastic, the expected con-
tinuation value, only conditional on A, is
EA
[
n · V (Kg, kg, A′)+ (1− n)V (Kb, kb, A′)]
Therefore, the Bellman equation becomes the following,
V (K, k,A) = max
s≥0,1≥α≥0
{
U (w + ϕk − s) +
β · EA
[
n · V (Kg, kg, A′) + (1− n)V (Kb, kb, A′)]
}
3. Assume the interior solution (or n < 1) and derive the first-order conditions
(from now on, EA is replaced by E for simplicity)
the first-order condition with respect to s:
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U ′ (c) = β · E
 n · (r · α+R · (1−α)n ) · Vk (Kg, kg, A′)
+ (1− n) · r · α · Vk
(
Kb, kb, A′
)

the first-order condition with respect to α:
0 = E
[
n · (r · s−R · 1n · s) · Vk (Kg, kg, A′)
+ (1− n) · r · s · Vk
(
Kb, kb, A′
) ]
4. Rearrange the two first-order conditions and the system becomes
U ′ (c) = β ·R · E [Vk (Kg, kg, A′)]
U ′ (c)
(
1
r
− n
R
)
= β · (1− n) · E
[
Vk
(
Kb, kb, A′
)]
5. Derive the Envelope condition
Vk (K, k,A) = U
′ (c) ·
(
η ·A ·Kη−1 + (1− δ) · 1
r
)
6. Use the Envelope condition and update it one period forward. Replace
E [Vk (K
g, kg, A′)] and E
[
Vk
(
Kb, kb, A′
)]
on the right-hand side of the equa-
tion system. The equation system becomes two intertemporal equations,
U ′ (c) = β ·R · E
[
U ′ (cg) ·
(
η ·A′ ·Kg(η−1) + (1− δ) · 1
r
)]
U ′ (c) = β · (1− n)(1
r − nR
) · E [U ′ (cb) · (η ·A′ ·Kb(η−1) + (1− δ) · 1
r
)]
where
cg = c
(
Kg, kg, A′
)
and cb = c
(
Kb, kb, A′
)
Note that in the states where n = 1, backward inequality holds in the
second equation. It corresponds to the case where the financial market is
fully diversified.
A.1.2 A Special Case
The analytical solution can be derived from a special case, where δ = 1 and
U (c) = log (c). Using the guess that consumption is a function of aggregate
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capital and is not dependent on individual capital or, more precisely, consumption
is a constant fraction of aggregate output. That is, c = τ · A ·Kη. Moreover, the
conjecture of the law of motion of aggregate capital is the same as the individual
capital.
1. Replace consumption in the inter-temporal equations with this guess,
1
c
= β ·R · E
[
1
τ ·A′ ·Kgη ·
(
η ·A′ ·Kg(η−1)
)]
1
c
= β · (1− n)(1
r − nR
) · E [ 1
τ ·A′ ·Kbη ·
(
η ·A′ ·Kb(η−1)
)]
2. Rearrange both equations. Then, the expectation operator drops out,
1
c
= β ·R · η
τ ·Kg
1
c
= β · (1− n)(1
r − nR
) · η
τ ·Kb
3. Impose the equilibrium condition, K = k.
4. Replace kg and kb with their law of motion,
1
c
= β ·R · η
τ ·
(
r · α · s+R · (1−α)n · s
)
1
c
= β · (1− n)(1
r − nR
) · η
τ · r · α · s
5. Savings are replaced by (1− τ) · A · Kη, since savings are also a constant
fraction of output,
1− τ
τ
= β ·R · η
τ ·
(
r · α+R · (1−α)n
)
1− τ
τ
= β · (1− n)(1
r − nR
) · η
τ · r · α
6. Solving for τ and α from this equation system leads to the solution in the
text. It is obvious that τ is indeed a constant. The implied investment in
each risky security is
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F (n) =
R− r
R− r · ns
7. Impose the equilibrium condition, F ∗(n∗) = D1−γ (n
∗ − γ), and the equilib-
rium n∗(k,A) is thus obtained.
A.1.3 The Model with a Deterministic Trend
In this section, a similar model with deterministic trend is provided. One of the
critical assumptions is that the minimum size parameter D is growing with the
economy at the same growth rate. This assumption captures the idea that the
effect of micro-level project indivisibility (or non-convexity of production feasible
set) cannot be eliminated by growth alone1.
I assume that labor productivity grows constantly at the rate of g, that is
Γt = Γt−1eg, (where Γt is the labor productivity level in period t). Thus, the
production function at period t is
Yt = AtK
η
t · (Γt−1Lt)(1−η)
The system can be normalized by the growth factor Γt−1. I use the hat version
to denote the normalized variables:
x̂t =
xt
Γt−1
I start with the definition of the value function in sequential form,
Vt = Et
∞∑
s=t+1
βtu (ct)
1. Rearranging this with hat variables yields
Vt = (Γt−1)(1−σ)
(ĉt)
1−σ
1− σ + β ·
(
Et
∞∑
s=t+1
βs (Γs−1)(1−σ)
(ĉs)
1−σ
1− σ
)
2. Divide both sides by (Γt−1)(1−σ)
Vt
(Γt−1)(1−σ)
=
(ĉt)
1−σ
1− σ +
1
(Γt−1)(1−σ)
β ·
(
Et
∑
s=t+1
βs (Γs−1)(1−σ)
(ĉs)
1−σ
1− σ
)
1Intuitively, one can justify this assumption by observing that the size of the largest
project that a developed economy could afford, is much bigger now than its counterpart
a hundred years ago.
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3. Denote V̂t =
Vt
(Γt−1)(1−σ)
, so that
V̂t =
(ĉt)
1−σ
1− σ +
1
(Γt−1)(1−σ)
β ·
(
Et
∑
s=t+1
βs (Γs−1)(1−σ)
(ĉs)
1−σ
1− σ
)
4. Use V̂t+1 =
Vt+1
(Γt)
(1−σ) , so that
V̂t =
(ĉt)
1−σ
1− σ +
1
(Γt−1)(1−σ)
β ·
(
(Γt)
(1−σ) · EtV̂t+1
)
5. Rewrite the resource constraint, capital accumulation and portfolio defini-
tion with the hat version
ĉ+ ŝ = w(K̂, A) + ϕ
(
K̂, A
)
· k̂
φ̂ = α · ŝ and n · F̂ = (1− α) · ŝ
k̂′ =
{
r · α · ŝ+ (1− δ) k̂
r · α · ŝ+R · (1−α)n · ŝ+ (1− δ) k̂
if j > n with 1− n
if j ≤ n with n
where β̂ = eg(1−σ)β and it is easily shown that w(K̂, A) = w(K,A) and
ϕ
(
K̂, A
)
= ϕ (K,A) , respectively. The function form of decision rules will
be the same as those in the text.
A.2 Algorithm
I take two steps to solve the general equilibrium problem. First, I take an educated
guess of the function form of n (k,A) and discretize this function with a two-
dimension piecewise linear function, which is increasing in both k and A 2. The
choice of piecewise linear approximation is based on the observation that n (k,A)
is increasing and reaches 1, if k and A are sufficiently large. Taking the guess as
given, I solve the two functional equations with a root-finding method. I discretize
A and k in a two dimensional space with Chebyshev nodes and then interpolate
the consumption rule c (k,A) with two dimensional Chebyshev approximation with
nk × nA coefficients, where nk and nA are the numbers of collocation points of
2I use lower case k in this subsection to represent capital stock. It does not contradict
the previous section, since I am solving numerically the case, where the condition K = k
is imposed.
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capital and productivity level, respectively. Chebyshev approximation is used
to take advantage of the high accuracy of the solution. However, if the policy
function displays a kink-shape, the scheme may deliver a poor approximation. To
avoid this, I must interpolate the portfolio decision α (k,A) with a shape-preserving
piecewise approximation (with nk×nA coefficients). The following steps are taken
sequentially.
Step 1: Compute the left-hand side value at each collocation point of the k−A
mesh;
Step 2: Compute kb and kg, according to the law of motion of capital;
Step 3: Compute the right-hand side value at each collocation point of the
k −A mesh, which requires computation of the expectation;
Step 4: Compute the expectation using numerical integration with a modified
Tauchen algorithm;
Step 5: Solve the 2×nk×nA nonlinear equation system with Broyden’s method
and obtain the two policy functions.3
Moreover, I set up an outer loop to solve for n (k,A)
Step 1: Guess a pseudo function for n (k,A);
Step 2: Take the function as given and solve for s (k,A) and α (k,A) (see
above);
Step 3: Compute F (k,A) and D1−γ (n (k,A)− γ) at each state;
Step 4: If the difference is below the tolerance level, n∗ (k,A) is found;
Step 5: If not, update n (k,A) with a generalized bisection method;
Step 6: Return to Step 2 until the equilibrium condition is satisfied in Step 4.
3Care has to be taken that strict inequality in the second Euler equation may hold.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs
In this subsection, we prove the Lemma 1 and Results 1 and 2.
B.1.1 Lemma 1
Proof. Since c1 > 0, it implies,
a˜1
NR + y1 − a˜2NR > 0.
And a1 = 0 implies a˜1
NR = −h∗. Moreover, with assumption 1, the following
holds,
−a˜1NR > y2b + y1 − yr.
It follows immediately that,
a˜2
NR < yr − y2b.
B.1.2 Result 1
Proof. Given Lemma 1, we now proceed to prove our result that a˜2
NR > a˜2
R.
In the refinancing case, household solves,
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max
c1
u (c1) + E
(
u
(
cR2
)
+ u
(
cR3
))
such that
c1 = a˜1 + y1 − a˜2R.
And the first order condition reads,
1
2
·u′

(
a˜2
R + y2g
)
+ yr
2
+ 1
2
·u′

(
a˜2
R + y2b
)
+ yr
2
−u′ (a1 + y1 − a˜2R) = 0.
In the non-refinancing case, household solves,
max
c1
u (c1) + E
(
u
(
cNR2
)
+ u
(
cNR3
))
such that
c1 = a˜1 + y1 − a˜2NR.
The first order condition reads,
1
2
· u′

(
a˜2
NR + y2g
)
+ yr
2
+ 1
2
· u′
(
a˜2
NR + y2b
)
− u′
(
a˜1 + y1 − a˜2NR
)
= 0,
where a˜2 is an implicit function of a˜1, y2g, y2b and yr, which can be treated as
parameters. For convenience, we can define the following two functions:
gNR
(
a˜2
NR
)
=
1
2
·u′

(
a˜2
NR + y2g
)
+ yr
2
+1
2
·u′

(
a˜2
NR + y2b
)
+ a˜2
NR + y2b
2
−u′ (a˜1 + y1 − a˜2NR)
gR
(
a˜2
R
)
=
1
2
·u′

(
a˜2
R + y2g
)
+ yr
2
+1
2
·u′

(
a˜2
R + y2b
)
+ yr
2
−u′ (a˜1 + y1 − a˜2R)
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a˜2
NR and a˜2
R are the solutions to gNR
(
a˜2
NR
)
= 0 and gR
(
a˜2
R
)
= 0 respec-
tively.
Suppose by contradiction that a˜2
R ≥ a˜2NR. Recall Lemma 1, we know imme-
diately that,
u′

(
a˜2
R + y2b
)
+ yr
2
 <
u′

(
a˜2
NR + y2b
)
+ a˜2
NR + y2b
2
 ,
Moreover, it is straightforward that,
1
2
·
u′

(
a˜2
R + y2g
)
+ yr
2
− u′ (a1 + y1 − a˜2R)
≤ 1
2
·
u′

(
a˜2
NR + y2g
)
+ yr
2
− u′ (a1 + y1 − a˜2NR) .
Combing both of the inequalities, implies that,
gR
(
a˜2
R
)
< gNR
(
a˜2
NR
)
= 0.
which is a contradiction to the condition that gR
(
a˜2
R
)
= 0. Therefore, it has
to be true that a˜2
R < a˜2
NR.
B.1.3 Result 2
Proof. Building on Lemma 1, we can also show that the dispersion of consumption
is greater in the traditional mortgage case compared to the refinancing model.
First, recall the optimal choices of consumption in the second period for the two
different regimes are:
cR2g =
(
a˜2
R + y2g
)
+ yr
2
,
cR2b =
(
a˜2
R + y2b
)
+ yr
2
,
cNR2g =
(
a˜2
NR + y2g
)
+ yr
2
,
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and
cNR2b = a˜2
NR + y2b,
Prove by contradiction:
(
a˜2
R + y2g
)
+ yr
2
−
(
a˜2
R + y2b
)
+ yR
2
>
(
a˜2
NR + y2g
)
+ yr
2
− a˜2NR − y2b,
which can be reformulated as,
a˜2
R + y2g + yr − a˜2R − y2b − yr > a˜2NR + y2g + yr − 2a˜2NR − 2y2b,
−yr > −a˜2NR − y2b,
0 > yr − a˜2NR − y2b,
which contradicts Lemma 1, which states yr − a˜2NR − y2b > 0
B.2 Computational Details
As discussed in the main text, the fact that housing stock is traded with the
transaction costs is an important feature of the housing market. Transaction
costs induce an “inaction zone”of the household’s maximization problem. In other
words, there are discontinuities in policy functions and kinks in the value functions
and ex ant it is difficult to know where the discontinuities exist. We thus resort to
the value function iteration method with discretization of the whole state space,
which proves to be very robust. It is well known that the computing time increases
exponentially, when discretization of state space increases linearly. We make use of
parallel computing techniques to speed up the policy functions computing process.
We follow the algorithm below for solving stationary equilibrium:
1. Take interest rate r as given and compute the implied aggregate capital K
and the associated wage rate w.
2. Guess the discount factor β.
3. Solve for the value function in the last period of retired households, then
solve value functions recursively backwards for all the other age groups. The
associated policy functions are obtained.
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4. Compute the stationary distribution of households, given the policy func-
tions from step 3.
5. Given the stationary distribution, compute the aggregate wealth-to-income
ratio.
6. If the ratio is consistent with the target, then the open-economy equilibrium
is found. If not, go back to step 1 and update β.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 First Order Conditions
The Lagrangian is set up as follows,
L =
(
cγ (1− l)1−γ
)1−σ
1− σ + β · e
g·γ·(1−σ) · EV (k′, b′, z′, g′)
+λ ·
[
y + (1− δ) k − φ
2
(
k′
k
· eg − eµg
)2
k − b+ qb′ · eg − c− k′ · eg
]
The household chooses consumption optimally and it gives Equation (3.6) in
the text, [
cγ (1− l)(1−γ)
]−σ
γcγ−1 (1− l)(1−γ) = λ.
Similarly, he chooses labor supply optimally, which results in the following
condition,
[
cγ (1− l)(1−γ)
]−σ
(1− γ) cγ (1− l)−γ = λαezk1−αeg (egl)α−1 . (C.1)
Further, Equation (3.6) and (C.1) imply Equation (3.7) in the text,
c
(1− l) =
γ
(1− γ)yL.
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He chooses capital holding, given that he takes into account the adjustment
cost,
β · eg·γ·(1−σ) · EVk′(k′, b′, z′, g′) + λ ·
[
−φ · eg ·
(
k′
k
· eg − eµg
)2
− eg
]
= 0. (C.2)
Finally, he also chooses the debt level, so that
β · eg·γ·(1−σ) · EVb′(k′, b′, z′, g′) + λ · q · eg = 0. (C.3)
In order to solve for both Vk′(·) and Vb′(·), the Envelop theorem is applied,
which results in Equation (C.4) and (C.5), respectively.
Vk = λ ·
[
yk + (1− δ)− φ
2
[(
k′
k
· eg − eµg
)2
− 2
(
k′
k
· eg − eµg
)
k′
k
· eg
]]
. (C.4)
Vb = −λ. (C.5)
Update Equation (C.4) and combine it with Equation (C.2), the Equation (3.9)
is obtained. Similarly, Equation (3.8) can be found with Equation (C.5) and (C.3).
C.2 Steady State Information
In this subsection, all the variables in steady state are denoted with *. Based on
Equation (3.1), the interest rate equals the international interest rate, r = r∗, in
the steady state. And therefore, the price of bond at the steady state, q∗, is,
q∗ =
1
1 + r∗
.
Moreover, since the marginal productivity of capital should equate the inter-
national interest rate, it is straightforward to solve for the income-capital ratio in
steady state from production function, Equation (3.2),
y∗
k∗
=
r∗
1− α.
With the budget constraint, Equation (3.5), the consumption-income ratio can be
derived,
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c∗
y∗
= 1 + (1− δ − eµg) k
∗
y∗
+ (q∗ · eµg − 1) b
∗
y∗
.
Labor supply in the steady state is solved for with the intra-temporal relation
between labor and consumption choice, Equation (3.7),
l∗ =
(
1 +
c∗
y∗
(1− γ)
γα
)−1
.
Using production function again, the steady state information on capital is implied,
k∗ =
(
k∗
y∗
) 1
α
· eug · l∗
It is straightforward to compute steady state information on output, y∗, con-
sumption, c∗, leisure, n∗, net export, nx∗, and savings, s∗.
C.3 Log-Linearization
I log-linearize the whole equation system Υ around the non-stochastic steady state
(found in Appendix C.2) to obtain a linear difference equation system in the logs
of endogenous state variables, k and b, choice variables, y, c, n, l, nx and s, as
well as the exogenous productivity shocks, z and g. Formally, let x∗ be the steady
state value of variable x and x̂ the log-deviation of variable x from steady state
x∗,
x̂ =
(x− x∗)
x∗
≈ log (x)− log (x∗) .
The Cobb-Douglas production function (Equation (3.2)) is linear in logs and
therefore it requires no approximation:
ŷ = z + (1− α) · k̂ + α · (êg + n̂) .
The interest rate function (Equation (3.1)) is approximated by,
q̂ = −ψ · q∗ · b∗ · b̂′.
The budget constraint (Equation (3.5)) is replaced by the following log-linear ver-
sion,
0 = y∗ŷ − b̂b∗ + q∗b∗eµg
(
b̂′ + q̂ + êg
)
− c∗ĉ− x̂X∗,
where recall the definition of gross investment,
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x̂X∗ = k∗
(
eµg k̂′ − (1− δ) k̂ + êg
)
.
The next step is to log-linearize the first order conditions which are necessary
to characterize the solution of the system Υ. The intra-temporal choice between
labor and consumption (Equation (3.7)) is linearized by
0 = ŷ − n̂− ĉ+ l̂.
And moreover, the pricing formula for bond price (Equation (3.8)) and the inter-
temporal condition (Equation (3.9)) are approximated by,
0 = [γ (1− σ)− 1]Eĉ′ + [(1− σ) (1− γ)]El̂′
+ [γ (1− σ)− 1] êg − [γ (1− σ)− 1] ĉ
− [(1− σ) (1− γ)] l̂ − q̂,
and
0 = [γ (1− σ)− 1]Eĉ′ + [(1− σ) (1− γ)]El̂′ + [γ (1− σ)]Eêg′
+
[
(1− α) y
∗
k∗
] [
βeµg ·(γ(1−σ)−1)
]
Eŷ′ +
[
βeµg ·(γ(1−σ)−1)
]
φEk̂′′
−
[
βeµg ·(γ(1−σ)−1)
(
(1− α) y
∗
k∗
+ φe2·µg
)
+ φeµg
]
k̂′ − [γ (1− σ)− 1] ĉ
− [(1− σ) (1− γ)] l̂ + [φeµg + 1− γ (1− σ)] êg + φeµg · k̂
It is straightforward to log-linearize the rest of the equation system, the three
identities which characterize labor-leisure, net export and savings.
ŷ = Ẑ + (1− α) k̂ + α
(
Ĝ+ n̂
)
n̂x (nx)∗ = (1− (nx)∗) ŷ − X
∗
y∗
X̂ − c
∗
y∗
ĉ
s∗ŝ = ŷy∗ − ĉc∗
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